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Abstract
The last six months of the Trump administration witnessed interesting
developments regarding its legacy in the Middle East. The normalization of ties between
four Arab states and Israel constituted major breakthroughs not only in the regional interstate relations but also for the American foreign policy in the region.
In this context, this thesis offers insights into how to understand and evaluate the
administration’s approach towards these developments. Based on systematic and
empirical research, I analyze a corpus comprised of Trump-era foreign policy documents
regarding the Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian questions. I find, firstly, that the Trump
administration pursued a strategic shift in the American foreign policy in the Middle East.
This shift marked the confrontational “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran and
the top-down approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict embodied in the “Peace to
Prosperity” plan. Secondly, I find that the Trump administration engineered a geopolitical
transformation by pushing the Arab regimes towards a multi-faceted security alignment
with Israel. As a theoretical framework, I apply Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory to
Trump's approaches towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, I conclude
that the Trump administration set the stage for a more favorable containment of Iran as
the US continues to disengage from the region. It may have even facilitated a return to a
strategy of ‘Offshore Balancing’ in the Middle East in the long run.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Over the last decades, the US administrations have tried to contain the Islamic
Republic of Iran and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict1, obviously with different
approaches and outcomes. As far as the American foreign policy under the Trump
administration in the Middle East is concerned, certain scholars and analysts
acknowledge that there was a shift in the way the policies were conducted,
nevertheless, the description of this shift remains a matter of contention. Gingrich
(2017) argues that this shift is “Titanic” (para. 1) and “decisive” (para. 8). Along
similar lines, Quamar (2018, p. 273) views it as “significant” and “visible” in the
region. Yet, by contrast, it is advanced that the Trump administration did neither have
clear foreign policies (Walt, 2018; Zakaria, 2020) nor a strategy in the Middle East
(Cook, 2020).
Drawing on the literature in the field, there seems to be a gap in the knowledge
in terms of the examination of Trump’s legacy in the Middle East especially after the
end of the Trump mandate. In light of the recent and consecutive breakthroughs in
inter-state relations in the region, it is undeniable that the normalization of ties
between Israel and four Arab states opened a space of discussion in the research field
on how to develop a greater understanding and a more thorough evaluation of the
Trump-era foreign policies. In fact, it was the Trump administration that triggered and
sponsored the train of normalization with Israel. Therefore, the importance of the

1

This research acknowledges the sensitive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian question. Quite aware of the
different interpretations surrounding the topic, I adopt the more standard framework in the literature
since the focus of this research is to examine the Trump administration’s approach to the issue and not
offering a reinterpretation of the topic.
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Trump endeavors in bridging the gap between UAE, Bahrain, and Israel in addition to
the fact that all these states perceive Iran as a common threat has not been well
addressed yet in the scholarly works leaving wider questions with regard to how to
better approach the Trump’s legacy in the region.
So, to what extent did the American foreign policy in the Middle East under
the Trump administration change? And how did this shift affect transformations in the
region?
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis argues that the Trump administration pursued a strategic shift in
the American foreign policy in the Middle East that could potentially change the
geopolitical landscape in the region. This research has two objectives. The first
objective is to describe and examine this strategic shift that revolved around two
pillars: US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In relation to the
former, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal
and opted instead for a confrontational muscular campaign of “Maximum Pressure”.
That was clearly a different approach from the Obama administration’s
rapprochement with Iran. Similarly, the recent Arab-Israeli peace agreements and the
possible ongoing multiple-track negotiations were a result of yet another different
approach of the Trump-era foreign policy in the Middle East. This indicated another
considerable departure from the previous stances of US administrations towards the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one that is marked by a top-down approach. Accordingly,
I suggest that the importance of this shift on both axes should not be overlooked.
Research should not underestimate the extent of this shift; it mirrors a shrewd,
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thoughtful, and masterful strategy that was well calculated and executed by the Trump
administration.
Concerning the second objective of this thesis, I attempt to evaluate the
implications of these two Trump-era policies at the geopolitical level in the Middle
East. I contend that the Trump administration engineered a geopolitical
transformation that better fits US disengagement from the region. This transformation
is primarily based on a GCC-Israeli security alignment, so strategic for the United
States to further contain Iran’s influence in the region. This security alignment may
represent even a stepping stone towards a return to an ‘Offshore Balancing’ strategy
in the long term. Indeed, according to the Abraham Accords, the security field
constitutes an instrumental element in the cooperation between UAE and Bahrain, and
Israel. It opens doors for access to territories, intelligence, joint military training, and
military and technological partnerships, to name a few. In light of this new regional
security alignment, I suggest Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ as an insightful
theoretical approach through which Trump’s legacy in the Middle East could be
understood and evaluated.
1.3 Research Contribution
The reconciliation between four Arab states and Israel in 26 years created
fresh areas for researchers to better approach Trump’s legacy in the Middle East from
dimensions the literature paid little attention to. This research contributes to the
exploration of the role of the Trump-era foreign policies in the Arab-Israeli
rapprochement especially in light of rallying US allies to confront Iran’s growing
influence in the region. It offers insights into the implications of the strategic shift in
American foreign policy in that it lays the ground for a new geopolitical scene based
3

on GCC-Israeli security alignment. In a nutshell, in light of the unprecedented
rapprochement between some of the Arab states and Israel, and the shared interest by
US allies in containing Iran and its proxies, this thesis hopes to better examine the
Trump-era foreign policies in the region which proves its importance and significance
in the research field.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis proceeds as follows. In the first section of the second chapter,
‘Historical background and literature review’, I outline the US approaches towards
Iran since the discovery of its nuclear program and prior to the Trump administration.
In the second section, I equally outline the US approaches towards the IsraeliPalestinian conflict before the Trump era. These two sections, relevant to the first
research question and objective, are crucial for my discussion, based on my research
findings, of the strategic shift in the American foreign policy under the Trump
administration.
In the third section, I shed light on some of the relevant literature that
addresses Trump’s legacy in the Middle East with certain works having favorable
views while others are rather pessimistic and critical of Trump’s legacy. A third block
in the literature just points out particular frameworks through which the Trump-era
policies in the region could be understood. The fourth section charts the evolution of
US strategies in the Middle East. Finally, the fifth section tackles the literature
pertaining to the transformation that the Middle East has recently witnessed. These
sections relate to my second research question and objective. They are also crucial for
my discussion of the implications of the strategic shift in the Trump-era policies on
the geopolitical landscape and regional power dynamics.
4

In the third chapter, I explain the methodology that will be used in this
research. To demonstrate the strategic shift in the American foreign policy in the
Trump era and its geopolitical implications, a corpus representative of different genres
of Trump-era foreign policy documents, will be subject to qualitative content analysis.
As a theoretical framework, I attempt to use Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’
theory to discuss how the Trump administration approached the insecurity of the Arab
regimes to push them towards an Arab-Israeli security alignment. In the fourth
chapter, ‘Results’, I feature the findings of the research, and then, in the ‘Discussion’
chapter, I analyze and interpret them.
In the concluding chapter, I sum up how my corpus findings indicated that the
American foreign policy in the Middle East underwent a strategic shift under the
Trump administration. This was carried out mostly through a unilateral approach,
often inconsistent with international norms, towards both the Iranian and the IsraeliPalestinian questions. Furthermore, my inferences suggest that this strategic shift
aimed to alter the geopolitical landscape and advance a security alignment between
the GCC regimes and Israel to swing the balance against Iran and its allied groups—in
line with the US disengagement from the region. My conclusion also suggests that an
Arab-Israeli2 security alignment could facilitate the return to an ‘Offshore Balancing’
strategy in the Middle East in the long run.

2

By Arab-Israeli, I mean the GCC regimes, Egypt, and Jordan and Israel
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Chapter Two: Historical background and literature review
In this chapter, I showcase the US approaches, prior to the Trump era, towards
Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In relation to the Iranian
question, the literature suggests that US stances were mostly premised on multilateral
cooperation, negotiation, and dialogue. Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian question,
the literature also shows the US initiatives put forward to resolve the chronic conflict
were mostly in accordance with international norms and consensus. Furthermore, I
present the literature regarding Trump’s legacy in the Middle East, the evolution of
US strategies towards the region, and the transformations that the latter has
undergone.
2.1 US approaches towards Iran’s nuclear program before the Trump
administration
It is true that as soon as Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons came to the light, the
US took an assertive approach towards Iran. Yet gradually it pursued a diplomatic
approach based on cooperation with the international community, especially the
European allies. There even existed certain occasions where the US pursued a
rapprochement with Iran. Whenever Iran chooses to be defiant to international
concerns, it faces concerted multilateral sanctions pushed by the US, its allies, and the
international community. In what follows, I outline some of the most important
stances that punctuated US approaches towards Iran prior to the Trump
administration.
Byman and Moller (2016) contend that the prevention of the spread of nuclear
weapons represents one of the fundamental US interests in the Middle East. Iran is
regarded by the US as a ‘rogue’ regime fanning terrorism and chaos across the Middle
6

East. President George. W. Bush, in his State of the Union message in 2002, included
it, along with Iraq and North Korea, in the “axis of evil” that “threaten[s] the peace of
the world” (The White House, 2002b, para. 21). John Bolton, former US Ambassador
to the UN under the Bush administration, in his testimony before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives in 2011, posits that Iran is prone
to irrationality and will not be influenced by the “calculus of deterrence” claiming that
“A theocratic regime that values life in the hereafter more than life on earth is not
likely to be subject to classic theories of deterrence….” (As quoted in Miller & Bunn,
2013, p. 16). It is in this context that the US deems the proliferation of nuclear
weapons as a major threat to its national security and interests. For its part, Iran
considers it vitally important to acquire nuclear weapons to protect its own national
security, although it always stresses its program is used for peaceful purposes
(Fitzpatrick, 2006). Dueck and Takeyh (2007) point out that one of the explanations
of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is the fact that two of its neighboring states
endured regime change by the use of force at the hands of the Bush administration.
In addition to the Iran Hostage Crisis, the discovery of Iran’s nuclear program
was a tipping point in worsening the relations between the US and Iran. Whilst, in
December 2002, the international community found out that Iran managed to build
two nuclear facilities, in Arak and Natanz, in August 2003, inspectors from IAEA
confirmed that they discovered enriched uranium “at rates superior to what is
necessary for civilian use” (Security Council Report, 2020, 26 August 2003 section).
Notwithstanding sticking to the negotiation track with the international community
regarding Iran, El-Khawas (2005) argues the Bush approach was so assertive, and
even aggressive, to the point that, during the first term, the administration did not rule
7

out the resort to military power against Iran to defend US interest and security. As he
puts it, the administration invariably “threatened to take the matter into its own hands”
(p. 29) given it was in a mood of unilateralism and regime change in the region.
Yet El-Khawas points out that, during the second term, the Bush stance
remarkably changed “becoming more conciliatory and favoring negotiations” (pp. 3233) emphasizing the importance to work closely with the European allies to persuade
Iran to eschew a nuclear path. Dueck and Takeyh (2007) affirm that the Bush
administration pursued in its second term a multilateral diplomatic path based on
negotiation. In their words:
The EU was initially encouraged by Washington to put a number of economic
and diplomatic carrots on the table in order to induce Iran to negotiate. Iran's
response was so gratuitously uncooperative that the United States was able to
win limited economic and weapons-related sanctions against Iran from the UN
Security Council in December 2006. (p. 201)
In 2006, when officially rejecting a deal proposed by the EU+3, Iran endured
numerous UN sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. From 2006 to 2015, a
range of UNSCRs was adopted regarding Iran’s nuclear issues: 1696, 1737, 1747,
1803, 1835, and 1929. Interestingly, the arrival of the Obama administration sparked
new prospects for the diplomatic impasse. Wechsler (2019, p. 27) highlights how
President Obama, in his Cairo Speech in 2009, invited Iran for diplomatic talks over
its nuclear ambitions. President Obama said: “my country is prepared to move
forward without preconditions” understandably knowing that “any nation – including
Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its
responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”. What is much more
8

important for Wechsler is that President Obama “downplayed” US assertive portrayal
of Iran as a rogue regime that sponsors terrorism by simply referring to it as one that
“played a role” in spreading violence. Indeed, this is indicative that the Obama
administration eschewed confrontational rhetoric with the Iranian regimes hoping that
this would ease the tensions and pave the way for a diplomatic breakthrough.
Meanwhile, the US continued to impose its own sanctions on Iran, targeting an
array of sectors ranging from energy to arms to banking (Katzman, 2021). Similarly,
the EU reinforced its own economic sanctions on Iran, including a full ban on Iranian
oil exports, in retaliation to Iran’s suspension of oil exports to the United Kingdom
and France in 2012. (Security Council Report, 2020). Despite the severity of
sanctions, Iran did not seem to be deterred from moving ahead with its nuclear
program. Indeed, by 2015, the Obama administration recognized that Iran possessed
“a uranium stockpile” able “to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs” (The White House,
2016, para. 7).
Yet 2015 marked a breakthrough not only for US diplomacy but also for the
entire international community in solving one of the most pressing issues in the
Middle East. Indeed, the Obama administration reached a deal with Iran regarding its
nuclear program. Formally referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), the deal, also commonly known as Iran Nuclear Deal, was signed by the
US, Iran, the EU, France, Germany, the UK, Russia, and China. The deal stipulated
that Iran halts its nuclear program for at least 10 years in exchange for having the
international community lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Iran (U.S.
Department of State, 2015). On the importance of the deal, President Obama stressed
that it was “a victory for diplomacy, for American national security, and for the safety
9

and security of the world” (The White House, 2015, para. 1). Fitzpatrick (2015)
affirms that the JCPOA is “A Good Deal” (p. 1). For its part, the United Nations
welcomed the agreement with the then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon describing it
as “historic” (UN News, 2015, para. 2). In this regard, in 2015, the UN Security
Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2231 which endorsed the JCPOA. It is worth
noting that UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 were all terminated
with the adoption of UNSCR 2231 (Arms Control Association, 2017).
The accord has been strongly criticized by different parties for a myriad of
reasons, however. Ben-Meir (2014) summarizes the concerns of the critics about the
Iran Nuclear Deal. Firstly, opponents of the agreement argue that this rapprochement
with Iran regarding its nuclear program came at a cost which was the unchecked and
continuous expansion of Iran in the region. This implied that Iran would benefit
tremendously from an economic standpoint since foreign investment would pour into
Iran, which in turn could be potentially translated into further support of regional
actors notably Hezbollah and Hamas. In the same respect, after 10 years, Iran would
have sufficient financial resources to embark on another accelerated program of
nuclear weapons. Secondly, it is also argued that the inspection process was loose and
gave Iran a major leeway to cheat. For instance, Ben-Meir writes: “despite Iran’s
assurances to address UN concerns including the Parchin military site, it did not agree
on the intrusive inspection regime that the International Atomic Energy Agency
requires to ensure that Iran’s programme is peaceful” (para. 23). Put simply, certain
pundits argue that Iran cannot be trusted.
Regarding the regime sanctions, certain scholars and analysts question their
effectiveness in fending off Iran’s nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, they were
10

counterproductive by pushing Iran to speed up its nuclear enrichment. By way of
example, Gordin and Nephew (2017) point out that, under the effects of the sanctions,
Iran increased the enrichment level from 5% to 20%. Moreover, the number of
centrifuges also jumped from 3000 to 22,000 with the construction of more
sophisticated and rapid ones. Furthermore, it built another enrichment plant in Fordo
(as cited in H. Mousavian & M. Mousavian, 2017).
In a nutshell, prior to the Trump administration, the US pursued a multilateral
approach that considerably used dialogue and negotiation, to contain Iran’s program
of nuclear weapons. Multilateralism and diplomacy were advanced in the second term
of the Bush administration and took momentum during the Obama tenure. It is
undeniable that the path toward US rapprochement with Iran was fraught with a
plethora of constraints, but the US continued to cooperate with the rest of the
international community to address Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Particularly, it
continued to work closely with its EU allies until it reached the JCPOA. This was
remarkably reversed with the Trump administration.
2.2 The US approaches towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the Trump
administration
In this section, I shall outline the peace initiatives put forward by the US to
resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prior to the Trump mandate, the
US administrations suggested several plans that were relatively in concurrence with
the international consensus that punctuated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In 1978, the Carter administration was deeply involved in the peace talks
between Egypt and Israel which led to the famous Camp David meeting in the US.
These diplomatic efforts eventually came to fruition with the signature of a formal
11

peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Dubbed the Camp David Accords: The
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, the peace treaty insisted that genuine and
durable peace between the Arab neighboring states and Israel should be “based on
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts” (National Archives, 2021,
para. 10). In 1982, President Ronald Reagan presented his administration's peace plan
in a public speech in September 1982. The Reagan Middle East Initiative signaled the
US longstanding support for the security of Israel but also highlighted “the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements” (para. 24). He stressed the
importance of compliance with UNSCR 242 which he described as “wholly valid”
and that “in return for peace, the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all
fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza” (para. 32). Equally important, President
Reagan pointed out that the US stance “on the extent to which Israel should be asked
to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and
normalization, and the security arrangements offered in return” (para. 32). On the
question of settlement, President Reagan called for “the immediate adoption of a
settlement freeze by Israel” (para. 28) in an attempt to inject a dose of confidence in
the Arab parties to initiate serious talks. Regarding the refugee issue, he said:
“Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I
agree” (para. 24). Finally, concerning the final status of Jerusalem, President Reagan
stated that only negotiations should solve the dispute, although he emphasized that the
city “must remain undivided” (United Nations, 1982, para. 31). It is worth noting that
before President Reagan suggested his plan, there was another peace initiative called
“The Fahd Peace Plan” put forward by Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi
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Arabia. The plan, comprising eight major points to resolve the conflict, was based on
UNSCRs 242 and 338, and the pre-1967 borders (Razvi, 1981).
For his part, President George. H. W. Bush suggested a peace plan, in a speech
before the Congress in March 1991, which revolved around the spirit of UNSCR 242.
Interestingly, the American foreign policies under the first Bush administration
underwent a significant shift from the Reagan administration regarding its support to
Israel. The then-Secretary of State James Baker exercised pressure on the Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to put an end to the Israeli settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. He went as far as to warn the Israeli government that, in case
the settlement activities were not halted, the US would not ensure that Israel obtains
loan guarantees worth $10 billion to absorb Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet
Union. Eventually, this led to acute tensions between President Bush and PM Shamir
(Tessler, 2020). The Office of the Historian (2016a) corroborates that “The failure of
the plan, combined with sharp U.S.-Israeli exchanges over Israeli settlement-building
in the occupied territories, strained relations between Bush and Shamir” (para. 4).
When it comes to the Clinton era, it is interesting that, at the beginning of its
mandate, the Clinton administration relatively pursued a top-down approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict but failed. The administration tried to strike a peace deal
between Israel and Syria prioritizing it over a direct solution between the Israelis and
the Palestinians. The Clinton administration thought it would be more practical to find
common grounds between Israel and Syria as the former could easily withdraw from
the Golan Heights, which was not the case for the West Bank due to its complexity.
The rationale behind prioritizing neighboring states to Israel over the Palestinians was
also hoping for a ‘spillover effect’ that could trigger Lebanon to think seriously about
13

a peace agreement with Israel. In light of this, the Clinton administration oriented its
focus and efforts to an Israel-Syria agreement and managed to bridge the gap in the
negotiation before it reached a dead end due to disagreement on to what extent would
Israeli withdraws from the Golan Heights (Office of the Historian, 2016b).
During 2000, the Clinton administration made a few diplomatic attempts
before leaving office. Of paramount importance is the Camp David II initiative hosted
by President Clinton in July. The Clinton offer revolved around three major pillars.
The first one was that the future Palestinian State will encompass the entire Gaza Strip
and more than 90% of the West Bank. The second one proposed that Palestinians will
be granted control over The Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. The third
pillar was a considerable recompensation for the refugee issue. Although the
negotiations lasted a couple of weeks, the outcomes fell short of the expectations
(Rosenberg, 2011). In light of the failure of Camp David II, the Clinton administration
crafted another initiative known as the “Clinton Parameters”. President Clinton
insisted that if the new offer, in line with Resolutions 242 and 338, is not accepted, it
will vanish when his mandate is over. Presented in his meeting with the Israeli and
Palestinian delegations on December 23, 2000, President Clinton’s new proposal
envisioned a Palestinian state comprising of between 94 and 96% of the West Bank
territories, in addition to an exchange of between 1 and 3% of Israeli territories as a
recompensation for the Israeli settlements in West Bank. Regarding Jerusalem, while
the Palestinians will exercise sovereignty over the Haram, the Israelis will exercise
sovereignty over the Western Wall. Concerning the refugee question, President
Clinton “believe[s] that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material
suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war” and called for
14

its cooperation with the rest of the international community regarding “compensation,
resettlement, rehabilitation, etc” (United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p. 2).
Under the George W. Bush administration, a new multilateral initiative to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict saw the light. Dubbed the ‘Road Map for
Peace’, also known as the ‘Road Map’, the peace plan was developed by the United
States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia. Referred to as “the
quartet”, these parties worked for hand in hand and endorsed a two-state solution
based on previous UN Security Council resolutions. The initiative was first suggested
by President Bush in a speech delivered on June 24, 2002, in the Rose Garden.
President Bush was hopeful that “the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be
ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions
242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognize borders” (para. 20).
Regarding the question of Jerusalem, President Bush said that both parties must work
together to settle their disputes about Jerusalem. Equally important, President Bush
also stressed the importance of finding a solution for “the plight and future of
Palestinian refugees”, in addition to the establishment of peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbors (The White House, 2002c, para. 21). Notwithstanding the
international endorsement of such a plan, the ‘Road Map’ bore no fruits.
Following the Beirut Summit in 2002, a prominent Saudi-led Arab initiative,
in accordance with UNSCR 242 and 338, was offered to Israel. Dubbed The Arab
Peace Initiative, unanimously adopted by the Arab League, the plan stipulated a twostate solution based on the pre-1967 borders. In exchange for that, the Arab states
would recognize the existence of the state of Israel in addition to the establishment of
diplomatic ties with it. East Jerusalem had to be the capital of the Palestinian state,
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with the latter encompassing both the West Bank and Gaza strip. Regarding the
refugee question, the initiative insisted on the “Achievement of a just solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 194” (Al-bab, 2002, OP 2-II).
In line with the previous administrations, the Obama administration attempted
to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians in compliance with
international consensus. As underscored by Tessler (2020), President Obama
delivered a powerful speech in May 2011 advocating for the creation of an
independent Palestinian state in accordance with the pre-1967 borders. In this regard,
Tessler states that Secretary of State John Kerry invested heavily in the quest for a
peace deal between the two parties. Whilst Secretary Kerry succeeded in reigniting
peace talks that managed to bring the Israelis and Palestinians to one table for
negotiation, his initiative failed in less than a year. The Obama administration's
stance towards the conflict strained relations with the Israeli government under the
leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however. This was evident in the
US decline, in December 2016, to veto a UNSC Resolution that condemned Israeli
continuous settlements on the lands it annexed since 1967. Indeed, it was a significant
move from the United States in the UN Security Council that rejected the ongoing
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. In the same respect, in his final speech,
Secretary of State John Kerry rebuked the Israeli settlements and indicated that they
continued to constitute a hurdle in establishing meaningful peace between the Israelis
and Palestinians (Sanger, 2016).
To sum up, US peace initiatives and endeavors, prior to the Trump
administration, did not move away from the internationally backed track to resolve
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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Issues such as the Israeli settlements in the West Bank,
the status of East Jerusalem, as well as the Palestinian refugee question, were
noticeably recognized by the US administrations from both sides of the aisle.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that historically, the protection of Israel has been
considered a US national interest across the different administrations, be they,
Republican or Democrat. This special relationship rests on three premises: security
interests, shared values, and domestic support (Byman & Moller, 2016; Erdoğan &
Habash, 2020). In fact, since 1972, the US has frequently activated its veto power in
the UN Security Council to defend Israel from any form of condemnation or criticism.
The Jewish Virtual Library (n.d.) tracks all the vetoes the US used to reject
resolutions against Israel.
2.3 Trump-era foreign policy in the Middle East: Existing literature and
theoretical frameworks
Quamar (2018) suggests that the Trump-era foreign policies have been
“primarily focused on West Asia” (p. 272). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Trump’s
legacy in the Middle East ignited a fierce debate in the scholarly field. Indeed, the
literature on Trump’s legacy in the Middle East can be broken down into 3 main
blocks. Whilst it produced a flood of criticism at several levels, a growing body of
scholarship also shows that there were several positive aspects of Trump’s legacy in
the region. A third block rather addresses the different theoretical lenses from which
the Trump-era American foreign policy could be approached.
2.3.1. A neutral and optimistic block
Quamar (2018) argues that it took the Trump administration only a year and a
half to showcase a “significant” (p. 273) and “visible departure from the Obama’s
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policy in West Asia” (p. 272). For him, the departure in American foreign policy is
manifested in three policies. Firstly, President Trump left US military bases in Syria,
even though ISIS was defeated. He also militarily hit the Assad regime twice to
punish its use of chemical weapons whereas Obama refrained from doing so.
Secondly, he moved ahead with the moving of the US embassy to Jerusalem. Thirdly,
President Trump reversed Obama’s rapprochement with Iran.
Boys (2021) stresses that “it must be recognised that there were successes
associated with the Trump presidency” (p. 29), among which was the Abraham
Accords, despite the appointment of Jared Kushner, a state developer, which
understandably raised the eyebrows of critics. Feith and Libby (2020, p. 38) argue that
the Trump approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict succeeded in shattering the
longstanding concern of the “Arab street”. The US used to take Arab public opinion
into consideration for fear that its interests in the region would be in jeopardy. Yet
with the Trump administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel as
well as the “Peace to Prosperity” plan, Feith and Libby assert that “arguments about
the "Arab street" will be evaluated with skepticism” as far as American foreign policy
towards the conflict is concerned.
In his assessment of Trump’s foreign policies, Blackwill (2019) writes a report
in Council on Foreign Relations entitled Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than
They Seem. In the Middle East section, Blackwill focuses on American foreign
policies towards Iran, Syria, and Israel, among other states. In relation to Iran,
Blackwill justifies US withdrawal from the JCPOA and highlights its flaws yet notes
President Trump suggested no alternative. Overall, he contends that, contrary to the
predictions of a score of pundits, the withdrawal from the accord did not have serious
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consequences despite the absence of a clear alternative for the deal. With regard to
Syria, Blackwill views that President Trump has pursued the right policies in Syria. In
the beginning, he concurs with some pundits that the Trump administration’s policies
in Syria were inconsistent, ambiguous, and confusing. He mentions how President
Trump had surprisingly declared that the US would withdraw its troops in Syria
before he stepped back after some members of his administrations, such as Secretary
of Defense James Mattis, publicly contradicted him. However, Blackwill argues that
President Trump was not wrong to pull out US troops from Syria since the primary
US mission was to defeat the Islamic State, which was the case for Blackwill.
Concerning US relations with Israel, Blackwill points out that President Trump was
no different from his predecessors in terms of their support to Israel, although
President Trump has invested more in the US ally, both militarily and diplomatically.
He writes that the president’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem “was the
right step to take and did not produce the harms that critics predicted” (p. 47),
although his administration could have traded the decision with halting the Israeli
settlements. On the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, Blackwill draws
attention that Trump’s recognition of such a move would further exacerbate the
situation in the Middle East.
2.3.2. A critical and pessimistic literature
In an article in the Foreign Policy magazine entitled “Trump’s Middle East
Legacy Is Failure”, Cook (2020) acknowledges that President Trump achieved a
certain level of success in the Middle East, yet argues he neither presented nor
pursued a clear, harmonious, and comprehensive strategy. Cook writes: “the president
has had a handful of successes—but never anything approaching a strategy” (subtitle).
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Cook claims that “the only way to describe U.S. policy in the region is “strategic
incoherence” (para. 2). Cook metaphorically depicts Trump’s view of American
foreign policies in the Middle East, and more generally in the world, as driven by a
Lazy Susan approach. One day, President Trump focuses on Syria. The next day is on
NATO. The day after, his focus would be shifted to Venezuela or Iraq and so on.
On Iran, Cook praises the US killing of General Qassim Soleimani yet affirms,
what Blackwill (2019) already mentioned, that such a move fell short of a clear
strategy on Iran, despite the “Maximum Pressure” campaign. Regarding President
Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity”, Cook argues that it was unrealistic in its suggestions,
thus it has not gone that far after the Palestinians categorically rejected it. He writes:
“When it became clear that the Palestinians were not interested in such a one-sided
deal, the president lost interest” (para. 6). This does not mean that Cook does not
admit Trump’s success in the Abraham Accords as well as the more recent
normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan, however. What Cook seems to miss
in his evaluation of US strategy in the Middle East is that the Trump administration
pursued a top-down approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the sense that it
pushed for the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel at the expanse
of the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Allied to Cook’s analysis is the view of
Zakaria (2020) who writes: “Trump does not have a foreign policy. He has a series of
impulses — isolationism, unilateralism, bellicosity — some of them contradictory”
(para. 6). By way of example, Zakaria states that the Trump administration’s policies
on Syria were ambiguous, inconsistent, and conflicting. He mentions how President
Trump had surprisingly declared that the US would withdraw its troops in Syria
before he refrained from doing so. For his part, Walt (2018) goes as far as to assert
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that the Trump-era “foreign policy is essentially a chaotic, confusing, and inept
version of his predecessors’ approach” (pp. 16-17).
Along similar lines, Wechsler (2019, p. 29) argues that the Trump-era foreign
policy in the Middle East has been marked by inconsistency, unpredictability, and
erraticism with regard to an array of issues in the Middle East. He maintains that
certain leaders in the Middle East hoped to see a “return to normalcy” in the
American foreign policy with the election of a new President in 2016, after a period of
status quo revision under the Bush administration and uncertainty under the Obama
administration. “Instead, President Trump has already proven to be even more
inconsistent and unpredictable, and even more willing than either of his last two
predecessors to depart from longstanding American policy norms”.
Azizi et al. (2020) argue that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign failed to halt
Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region, even though it succeeded in crippling the
Iranian economy. Iran embarked on a program to develop its capabilities in missiles
and navies. Furthermore, it further invested in its anti-containment resistance
premised on “asymmetric deterrence” (p. 159). This included strengthening its
relations with its militant proxies and helping them develop their drone and missile
capabilities such was the case with the Houthis and Hezbollah. Moreover, it proved it
could retaliate against the US pressure such was the case when it shot down the
Global Hawk drone in June 2019 by the Third of Khordad, a locally advanced air
defense system. In short, for Azizi et al., the Trump administration’s “Maximum
Pressure” campaign was counterproductive as threats facing the US interests in the
region further intensified. It simply led to an Islamic Republic’s “maximum
resistance” (p. 156).
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Katzman (2021) corroborates that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign did not
manage to curb Iran’s alleged destabilizing activities across the region. It is true that
Iran dwindled its fighters in Syria. Furthermore, according to Brian Hook’s testimony
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2019, from 2017 to 2018, the Iranian
regime reduced the defense budget by 28 percent and the IRGC one by 17 percent.
Moreover, Hezbollah, facing serious economic problems, had to resort to donations,
among other things, to fund its operations and pay its fighters. In addition to that, the
Iranian regime itself witnessed sporadic waves of unrest in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in
light of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions due to the economic sanctions.
Yet in spite of these challenges, Iran did not succumb to the American pressure. Its
regime proved to be quite resilient. Iran remains entrenched in the Syrian and Yemeni
civil wars but also in Iraqi and Lebanese affairs. In this regard, Katzman suggests that
the imposition of tough sanctions on Iran, even before the Trump administration’s
economic campaign, had “minimal effect on Iran’s regional behavior” as it “has
remained engaged in these regional conflicts” (p. 50). Equally important, the Trump
administration’s approach did not preclude Iran from moving forward with its nuclear
weapon program. Indeed, in February 2020, Secretary of State Antony Blinken
declared that it would take Iran “a matter of weeks” (para. 2) to develop a nuclear
bomb if it did not end its violation of the terms of the Iran Nuclear Accord (Obaid,
2021), which is indicative of the limitations of the Trump administration’s policies
towards Iran.
In the same vein, the Trump administration’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign
might be counterproductive in reaching another accord with Iran. Katzman (2021)
points out that the campaign led to a surge of hardliners elected to the Iranian
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parliament, who secured a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections held in
February 2020, while at the same time weakening President Rouhani who is more
open to negotiations with the US. Indeed, in late February 2021, Iran lawmakers
called for the prosecution of President Rouhani following his alleged violation of a
law passed in December 2020. This law obliges the Iranian government to halt the
voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol under the JCPOA in an attempt
to restrict IAEA inspection of nuclear-related sites (Motamedi, 2021). Even though
the call for punishing the Iranian government was disputed by the Supreme National
Security Council, it was illustrative of the critical stance that the Iranian parliament
has in relation to future negotiations with the US.
From a different perspective, Solhdoost (2018) argues that the Trump
administration has reduced American foreign policy to a mere transactional business
between the US and its allies and adversaries alike. He offers an explanation of
Trump's foreign policies based on a transactional framework. For Solhdoost, this
approach rendered US national interests and the President’s personal interests
intertwined and overlapped, posing a real danger to US interests abroad. In addition to
the outpouring of millions of dollars of campaign donations and investments for the
Trumps and the Kushners’ business, Solhdoost points out how President Trump
appointed his closest friends to senior positions, although they may lack the required
diplomatic experience such as was the case with the US Ambassador to Israel, who
served as Trump’s bankruptcy lawyer. It is in this context that Solhdoost asserts that
Israel took advantage of the business interests that drive both the Trump and Kushner
families to steer the American foreign policy in the Middle East in the way it wants,

23

as was illustrated in the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the relocation of
the US embassy to Jerusalem after recognizing the latter the capital of Israel.
2.3.3. Multiple theoretical lenses
A third block in the literature concerns the scholarly work that attempts to
understand American foreign policy from different lenses. The literature addressed
Trump’s legacy in the Middle East from theoretical perspectives related to structural
dynamics, populism, and Jacksonianism, among other angles.
Yom (2020) claims that, in the Trump era, the Middle East witnessed a
“decline” of the US “hegemonic” role (p. 75). He traces this back to the Obama
administration which started to retreat from the region largely due to structural
factors, mainly “the end of severe threats” (p. 81). Accordingly, the Trump
administration “logically follow[ed] this downward arc of involvement” (p. 80) in the
affairs of the region. Yom expects that the US will continue to withdraw from the
Middle East and pursue a strategy of ‘Offshore Balancing’ in an attempt to rebalance
the cost of maintaining order in the region. As a consequence, this will trigger a
change in the geopolitical terrain as Russia and China will be allowed to play a bigger
role in the arena. Similarly, Quamar (2018) maintains that “the common chord
between Obama’s legacy and Trump’s policies in West Asia is that the USA is losing
ground to emerging global powers” (p. 272), mainly Russia and China, although the
US will continue to play the role of security guarantor, indicating a shift in the
geopolitical arena in the Middle East.
Hassan (2020) argues that the American foreign policy under the Trump
administration was driven by an ‘America First’ policy paradigm. Hassan’s research
reveals that President Trump used populism as a major framework in his speeches and
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linked it explicitly to the dire consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. His research
meticulously scrutinizes the discursive-ideological formations of the ‘America First’
paradigm. He examines a corpus of 3,114,973 words emanating from the speeches of
President Trump between 2015 and 2017. Hassan finds that “prescriptions of
American decline were consistently articulate with an imperial right over the Middle
East” (p. 134). This is evident in the President's recurrent assertion about ensuring the
control of the oil in the region, by insisting on the US right to “take the oil”, which
illustrates “a desire for an imperium par excellence” (p. 134). Cha (2016) also
confirms that Trumpism was triggered by, among other factors, the worsening
socioeconomic conditions that accompanied the global economic crisis of 2008 and
how it crippled the working and middle classes in the US.
Hassan suggests that the Trump administration attempted also to assert US
imperial power over the Middle East through its endeavor to create an “Arab NATO”.
Hassan goes on to state that the formation of such an alliance would “somehow
institutionalize America hegemony by bringing the Gulf powers together to balance
against Iran and Chinese interventions”, similar to the creation of the Central Treaty
Organization, also known as the Baghdad Pact, which is very important given “the
parameters of a limited US commitment” (p. 135). He claims that such an attempt is
“Doomed to failure” (p. 135) and that the Trump administration will rely on “the
authoritarian strongman model of imperial control” (p. 125) instead. In this respect, he
cites two examples: the unconditional support for Saudi Arabia as illustrated in the
impunity of the Al-Saud family regarding the assassination of Saudi dissident Jamal
Khashoggi and President Trump calling President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt
“where’s my favorite dictator?” (p. 136).
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From a different perspective, Clarke and Ricketts (2017) argue that the Trump
administration follows the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy as
distinguished by Walter Russell Mead. They state that President Trump taps on the
principles of populism and the possible use of military power. By the same token,
Ettinger (2020) corroborates that President Trump adopts the Jacksonian school of
foreign relations by his embrace of a certain form of “populist sovereignty” (p. 411).
The latter is associated with US leaders’ commitment to the service of the American
public, the ‘folk community’. It is within this context that Jacksonians do not prefer
international commitments that restrict US sovereignty and curb its freedom. Cha
(2016) affirms that the Trump administration embodies Jacksonianism in that it holds
deep-seated suspicion about multilateralism and international laws. He underscores
that candidate Trump “suggested neo-isolationist and neo-sovereigntist
countermeasures… against dominant multilateralism or globalism” (p. 89).
2.4 Evolution of US strategies in the Middle East
2.4.1 Offshore Balancing
Mearsheimer and Walt (2016) and Walt (2018) contend that, during the Cold
War, the US adopted an ‘offshore balancing’ strategy in the Persian Gulf, a strategy
that they further theorized and presented as an alternative to ‘liberal hegemony’. They
explain that offshore balancing revolves around the maintenance of the US regional
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the insurance of balance of power in key
regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. This implies that the US would
lead by example and rely on key regional allies to balance against any possible
regional hegemon. If the balance of power is in peril, the US would intervene and
reinstate the status quo. Practically, during the Cold War era, the US relied on two key
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regional allies—the Saudi kingdom and the Shah regime in Iran—to preserve its
interests in the Middle East—a policy also known as ‘Twin Pillars’. When the Islamic
revolution occurred in Iran in 1979 and gave rise to the Islamic revolutionary regime
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Rapid Deployment Force was quickly forged by the
Carter administration to prevent the subversion of the balance of power in the region
by Iran or the Soviet Union. Yet American grand strategy during the post-Cold War
period has remarkably changed. ‘Offshore balancing’ as a strategy in the Persian Gulf
came to an end after the US intervention in Kuwait in 1991.
2.4.2 Liberal Hegemony
The deep entanglement of the US in the region was carried out under the Bush
administration with its strategy of “regional transformation” in Iraq and Afghanistan
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 3; Walt, 2018). In
the same vein, Stapleton (2016) is right to point out that the Bush administration
adopted democratic peace theory. Indeed, that was also clearly pursued in the first
term through President Bush’s Freedom Agenda promoted in his National Security
Strategy of 2002 (The White House, 2002a). In relation to unilateralism in American
foreign policy, Schmidt and Williams (2008) stress that the neo-conservatives camp in
the Bush administration advocated for the unilateral conduct of American foreign
policy. They write: “The most striking example of the administration's willingness to
proceed unilaterally, of course, was its decision to defy the will of much of the
international community, including the UN Security Council, and invade Iraq” (p.
198).
For their part, Daalder and Lindsay (2003) argue that the Bush administration
ushered in a revolution in American foreign policy and that this revolution was not “in
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America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them” (p. 2). They write that
President George W. Bush “relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather
than on international law and institutions to get his way” (p. 2), in addition to his
keenness on regime change. In this respect, it should be mentioned that President
Trump has frequently criticized the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq which,
according to the president, cost the US trillions of dollars and thousands of deaths, in
addition to the fact that it destabilized the Middle East. By way of example, candidate
Trump said, in a speech on American foreign policy hosted by the National Interest in
2016:
It all began with the dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies
out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western
democracy. We tore up what institutions they had and then were surprised at
what we unleashed. Civil war, religious fanaticism; thousands of American
lives, and many trillions of dollars, were lost as a result. The vacuum was
created that ISIS would fill. Iran, too, would rush in and fill the void, much to
their unjust enrichment. Our foreign policy is a complete and total disaster. No
vision, no purpose, no direction, no strategy (The National Interest, 2016).
2.4.3 Retrenchment
When it comes to retrenchment, the Obama strategy in the Middle East
remains a matter of debate among scholars and academics. On the one hand, Yom
(2020) underscores that the US undergoes a “Hegemonic Retreat” (p. 1) in the Middle
East which he traces back to the Obama administration and attributes to the new
structural dynamics in the region where a credible threat no longer exists. In other
words, the Obama administration started the withdrawal from the region, and opted
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instead for a ‘Pivot to Asia’. Brands (2018) corroborates the retrenchment strategy as
well as the ‘Asia Pivot’ pursued in the Obama era and remarks that this was necessary
as it “provided the country with a strategic breather after a period of overexertion” (p.
51) experienced under the Bush administration due to its overstretch in the Middle
East.
On the other hand, in the eyes of Mearsheimer and Walt (2016), the Obama
administration was no exception from the militarism and interventionism that marked
the American foreign policy in the Middle East. It made the same mistakes with its
intervention in Libya and entanglement in the civil war in Syria insisting that
President Bashar al-Assad “must go” (p. 3). Along similar lines, Stapleton (2016)
argues that the Obama administration did not renounce military approaches in
pursuing its interests in the Middle East, as was evidenced in the US-led coalition
against ISIS or the US bombardment of the Qaddafi forces in 2011. The
administration simply shifted its tactics, that is abandoning full-scale dispatching of
ground forces in the Middle East. Stapleton maintains that the Obama approach was
characterized by its “light footprint” (p. 2) when conducting military actions. This
includes the reinforcement of the capacities of the indigenous forces, such as the Iraqi
army or the moderate Syrian rebels, the deployment of certain Special Operations
Forces, and the reliance on US strike capabilities like the high frequency of drone
attacks.
2.5 Regional transformations in the Middle East before the Trump
administration
In what follows, I present some of the literature in relation to the changes that
the Middle East has undergone prior to the Trump administration. This is very
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important to better understand how the Trump administration capitalized on the
situation to push for more transformations in the region which would lay the ground
for the security alignment between the Arab regimes and Israel in their pursuit of the
shared interest in containing Iran, which eventually, suits US disengagement from the
Middle East.
In an in-depth coverage entitled How The Israel-UAE Alliance Formalizes
New Fault Lines in the Middle East, Odeh (2020) argues that the transformation that
the Middle East is undergoing “was facilitated by the weakening of former giants in
the region - Egypt, Iraq, and Syria - whose weakened states provided the opportunity
for new rules and new alliances” (para. 6). Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) corroborate
that “Since the early 2000s, the strategic landscape in the Middle East has profoundly
changed” (p. 5). They attribute the decline of Egypt to the worsening economic
conditions and the loss of its status as the leader of the Arab world. Regarding Iraq,
they maintain that it was plagued by regional wars and the rise of ISIS. As for Syria, it
was ravaged by the civil war that broke out in 2011.
As corroborated by Dazi-Héni (2020), Ferziger and Bahgat (2020), and Totten
(2016), there is much truth to Ryan’s (2015) claim that the Middle East witnessed a
number of “regional shocks” (para. 19), or what Al Ketbi (2020) calls “tectonic
shifts” (p. 392), such as the Arab uprisings and the US rapprochement with Iran under
the Obama administration. There is an increasing perception in the Middle Eastern
states that the US is growing more and more reluctant with regard to its traditional
and orthodox role as the guarantor of security and stability in the Middle East
(Ferziger & Bahgat, 2020; Ryan, 2015; Wechsler, 2019). Ferziger and Bahgat (2020)
remark that the US has traditionally defended the Gulf states following the Carter
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Doctrine. They take President George H.W. Bush’s intervention in Kuwait to liberate
it from the Iraqi invasion as the best example to illustrate the US commitment to
defend the GCC states. Yet things radically changed with President Bush’s invasion
of Iraq in 2003. For Ferziger and Bahgat, this “shifted the United States away from its
traditional role as the most powerful defender of the regional status quo to the primary
challenger of the existing state of affairs” (p. 6) which ironically resulted in the
empowerment of Iran. Wechsler also argues along similar lines. Equally important, as
far as the dwindling trust in the US is concerned, President Obama’s rapprochement
with Iran “set off alarm bells in the GCC states”. President Obama went so far as to
push Saudi Arabia to come to terms with the need to “share the Persian Gulf region
with Iran” (p. 6). Due to this volatility in American foreign policy, the US “is largely
seen as an unreliable partner who may be in the beginning stages of a strategic
withdrawal from the region” (p. 7), Ferziger and Bahgat underscore. Allied with this
view is that of Wechsler (2019) who posits that the US role in the Middle East has
become a mere “Question of Will” (p. 25). In his words: “The questions being posed
today are less about American capability than about American will, leading to deep
uncertainty as to whether the United States still defines its regional interests as it once
did”. In brief, Wechsler stresses that “Many local leaders worried that this might mark
a watershed in the path toward American strategic disengagement” (p. 29).
Some of the Obama-era policies in the region caused doubt in the views of
critics as well as allies. The abandonment of Egypt’s Mubarek by the Obama
administration following the Arab uprisings in 2011 and the acceptance of the Muslim
Brotherhood led some regimes in the Middle East to question the US support of its
traditional allies in terms of their national security and the survival of their regimes
31

(Quamar, 2018; Quero & Dessì, 2019; Wechsler, 2019, p. 28). In brief, certain
regimes were alarmed and concerned about the endorsement of democratization in the
region by the Obama administration which would put their regime in peril, given their
authoritarian nature. Moreover, Yarhi-Milo (2018) and Wechsler (2019, p. 28) argue
that the US resolve was put into question by the inaction of the Obama administration
against the Al Assad regime when it crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of using chemical
weapons against its people. Yarhi-Milo writes: “If Obama had not intended to follow
through on his threat, he should not have issued it in the first place” (p. 3). Therefore,
this could seriously cast doubt on the US willingness to firmly and assertively protect
its allies in the region, as affirmed by Al-Ubaydli (2016) and Freedman (2017), from
the threat of Iran. Furthermore, Freedman (2017) underscores that the rapprochement
of the Obama administration with Iran that culminated in the Iran Nuclear Deal led
some of the regimes in the Middle East to doubt the US willingness to contain Iran’s
ambition to possess nuclear weapons and expand its influence in the region. He
writes: “America’s Middle Eastern allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, were
particularly concerned that another American ‘red line’, preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon, would also be crossed without any US response” (p.
244). Similarly, Al-Ubaydli (2016) raises an important question about the willingness
of the Obama administration to attack Iran in case it closed the Strait of Hormuz after
it stepped back from its military actions against the Assad regime following its resort
to chemical weapons. He posits that the regional powers were doubtful about the “US'
commitment to deploying the Fifth Fleet to protect the Strait of Hormuz” given “the
US’ diminishing military activism in the Middle East” (para. 6).

32

When it comes to the formation of a coalition that counters Iran’s influence in
the Middle East, Totten (2016) points out that there is a rapprochement between some
Arab states and Israel in the making which could result in the formation of an Arab
Sunni-Israeli alliance whose main objective is to confront Iran’s influence in the
region. In his words:
The effect of all this is something no one would have predicted a couple of
decades ago and only the most astute predicted even a couple of years ago—
the Sunni Arab world, unofficially led by Saudi Arabia, is quietly forging a de
facto alliance with Israel against Iran. (p. 29)
In the same vein, following the meeting between Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal,
former intelligence chief, and Israeli Major General Yaakov Amidror, former national
security advisor, organized by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy on May
6, 2016, the Lebanese daily newspaper Assafir described the meeting as evidence that
Saudi Arabia has shifted its stance towards Israel and that it is now exploring the
formation of an Arab-Israeli alliance that would secure the rule of the Al Saud family,
as well as the stability of the GCC states, and fill the void of the US “withdrawal” (p.
2) from the region (as cited by Abdelaziz, 2016).
Similarly, Maher (2020) claims that the growing influence of Iran and its
proxies, coupled with its nuclear ambitions, has reinforced Israel’s sense of security
and pushed it to look for alternative forms of deterrence. Hence, a rapprochement
with the Arab states has become part of Israel’s new “overall deterrence strategy” (p.
17). Azodi (2020) posits that: “The emerging alliance has a strong potential to shift
the regional balance of power in favor of Iran’s adversaries, namely Saudi Arabia and
Israel, which in turn, could increase Tehran’s sense of insecurity” (p. 6).
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Chapter Three: Methodology
3.1 Data collection
Data for this empirical research comprised a corpus representative of different
genres of documents about the Trump-era American foreign policy in the Middle
East. The corpus was retrieved from the official documents published by the Trump
administration during its mandate with respect to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. This research thesis views the policies towards Iran’s influence in the Middle
East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as two important parameters in deepening
one’s understanding of the Trump-era American foreign policy and its geopolitical
implications in the region. Through these two parameters, data sets were identified
and interpreted.
The data source was primary and consisted of electronic textual documents
published by the Trump administration. The corpus contained policy documents such
as the “Maximum Pressure” campaign or President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity”
plan. The latter was designed by a team led by President Trump’s son-in-law and
former Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Jared Kushner. The team included Jason
Greenblatt, former Special Representative for International Negotiations, Avi
Berkowitz, former Assistant to the President and Special Representative for
International Negotiations, and Brian Hook, former U.S. Special Representative for
Iran and Senior Adviser to the US Secretary of State, to name a few. The corpus also
included agreements such as the Abraham Accords Declaration and the treaties of
peace between Israel and the Arab states with which it normalized ties. Equally
important, it encompassed everything publicly published by the Trump White House
and available in the ‘foreign policy’ section on its website archives from statements
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and releases, fact sheets, proclamations, to joint remarks, press briefings, op-eds, etc.
All these documents were carefully vetted as they were extracted from the official US
administration website, hence they can be considered as authentic and reliable
sources.
Regarding sample framing, inclusionary criteria included American foreign
policy documents in the Middle East under the Trump administration. Data in this
research were approached in a systematic manner. Preliminary research was carried
out and a total of 426 public documents derived from the White House website
archives were collected. After an in-depth review, exclusionary criteria were applied.
Only documents that were relevant to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were
identified as the sample. The ones related, for instance, to state and non-state actors in
questions other than Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, were not directly relevant
to this research and were therefore excluded from the data sample. By way of
example, statements on the passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said of Oman or the
First Lady Melania Trump’s meeting with Queen Rania of Jordan were eliminated.
This rendered the new sample size 390. The rationale behind applying such
exclusionary criteria was the magnitude of documents related to the Middle East and
the relevance of data to the research questions.
The time frame of the sample was from January 2017 to January 2021. This
period represented the Trump presidency and was of utmost importance and relevance
to the research topic as it covered the policies pursued by the Trump administration in
the region. President Trump’s pledges or promises as a presidential candidate
exceeded the scope of this thesis; therefore, President Trump’s tenure constituted a
convenient time frame to answer my research questions.
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3.2 Data analysis
Qualitative content analysis of the data gathered for this research was
conducted using an interpretive approach. Given that my corpus consisted of multiple
sorts of data, analysis of the findings hoped to develop a deeper understanding and
greater knowledge of the strategic shift that marked the American foreign policy in
the Middle East and its implications on the regional geopolitical map.
3.2.1 The classification scheme
In this thesis, my corpus was coded using a qualitative analysis software called
‘Quirkos’. Similar to ‘ATLAS.ti’ and ‘NVivo’, the software helped me to manually
code the data in a practical and effective manner. Its lively and interactive interface
represented the corpus findings in a visual way that helped detect the empirical
evidence that addressed my research questions. I strived to make this research
consistent and reliable by setting clear and well-defined coding and category rules. To
start with, the basic units applied for text coding were the ‘sentence’ and ‘paragraph’.
Codes in this corpus were developed following a deductive approach. In this regard,
Frey (2018) writes that “the researcher may begin with a collection of initial codes
derived from the keywords used in the literature search and the knowledge gained in
conducting the literature review for the study (p. 5). Accordingly, I placed a set of
initial codes that were extracted from my preliminary research of data collection and
that were reflective of the research questions as well as the objectives of this thesis.
These initial codes consisted of predetermined labels that were initially applied to a
subsample, a pilot study, and subsequently to the entire corpus. Codes were initially
elaborated as follows:

36

● Regarding Iran: Iran and its proxies as the common threat, a catastrophic
Iran Nuclear Deal, rebuilding mutual trust, rallying partners, multilateralism
vs. unilateralism, etc.
● Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: A rupture with the previous
approaches, the need for a new realistic approach, multilateralism vs.
unilateralism, bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel, ending the
chronic conflict, etc.
● Regarding the geopolitical implications: regional transformation, countering
Iran and its proxies, collective security and regional peace, economic
prosperity, etc.
At this juncture of the pilot study, codes were tested on a subsample of
documents. Frey (2018) suggests that a “diverse subsample of documents (6–12)”
from the whole corpus is sufficient for code testing. For this research, I selected a
subsample of 40 documents. They were obtained based on 4 ‘critical incidents’; each
incident followed by 9 consecutive documents. This implied that each parameter
assigned 2 incidents. The ‘critical incidents’ were identified according to certain
important events related to the Trump administration’s policies towards the Iranian
and the Israeli-Palestinian questions. In developing the ‘Critical Incident Technique’
as a separate research methodology, Flanagan (1954) posits that critical incidents
should have effects on the issue under examination and are determined based on the
judgment of the observer. He writes: “To be critical, an incident must occur in a
situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer and
where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its
effects” (p. 1). Drawing on this definition, I set two objective criteria that helped me
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identify the 4 critical incidents for the pilot study. The first criterion concerned the
importance of a decision regarding the Trump-era foreign policies towards Iran and
the Israeli-Palestinian questions. For instance, this could be an announcement,
signature, or withdrawal from an agreement. The second criterion was about the
effects or impact of a decision, be they negative or positive, on the respective
parameter. For example, a decision could spur an array of domestic and international
support or opposition and criticism.
Regarding Iran, a ‘critical incident’ in the Trump-era foreign policies was the
announcement of the Trump administration’s new strategy on Iran on October 13,
2017. This strategy signaled a new approach advocated by the Trump administration
to contain Iran’s influence in the region; therefore, it was worth the selection.
Accordingly, 10 documents were extracted starting from the announcement of the
strategy. Likewise, the withdrawal of the US from the Iran Nuclear Deal on May 8,
2018, constituted another crucial decision by Trump's administration in its strategy
towards Iran. Indeed, the unilateral withdrawal from the Iran deal represented a
tipping point in addressing Iran’s nuclear program, and thus it was worth choosing it
as a critical incident. Therefore, 10 documents were selected starting from the pull-out
from the deal.
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two critical incidents in the
Trump administration’s strategy were identified to select the remaining 20
subsamples. The first one was the announcement of the “Peace to Prosperity” plan on
January 28, 2020. This represented a crucial event in that it laid out President Trump's
vision on how to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and create stability in the Middle
East. Likewise, another critical incident for this research was the announcement of the
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normalization of ties between Israel and UAE on August 12, 2020. The event was a
breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli relations as it rejuvenated the normalization track
with Israel, after 26 years since the signature of the last peace deal between Israel and
Jordan. In light of these two critical incidents regarding the Trump administration’s
policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 10 documents were selected for each
critical incident.
The initial findings of the pilot study revealed that the pre-set codes that were
suggested following my preliminary research were strongly identifiable within the
subsample corpus. Results showed that 7 of my the pre-determined codes were the
highest and most dominant nodes in the corpus under study: ‘A catastrophic Iran
Nuclear Deal’ (219), ‘Ending the chronic conflict’ (188), ‘Bridging the gap between
the Arab states and Israel’ (151), ‘The need for a new realistic approach’ (126),
‘Regional Transformation’ (121), ‘Iran and its proxies as the common threat’ (93),
and ‘Countering Iran and its proxies’ (84). This suggested that the 40 subsamples, that
were selected based on the 4 critical incidents, were to a great extent illustrative of the
accuracy, validity, and reliability of my pre-set codes. The preliminary results seemed
to support the thesis statement underpinning this study: the American foreign policy
in the Middle East undertook a strategic shift under the Trump administration. This
shift was premised on the US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
By doing so, and as the US recalibrates its engagement in the region, the Trump
administration triggered a geopolitical transformation through an GCC-Israeli security
alignment to better curb the Iranian threat in the long run.
After the codes had been properly tested on the sum of the subsamples
identified for the pilot study, they were applied again to the entire corpus of
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documents. Based on the codes pinpointed, I set a group of categories/themes that
guided me through the interpretation of the findings. They were as follows:
(1) The adoption of a “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran
(2) The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan
(3) Triggering geopolitical transformation to confront Iran’s quest for regional
hegemony
3.2.2 Ryan’s ‘regime change’ theoretical framework
In the interpretation phase, based on document-based proof and evidence, I
examine the strategic shift in the Trump-era American foreign policy in the Iranian
and Israeli-Palestinian questions. Then, I explore insights into the implications of this
shift on the geopolitical landscape and security alignment in the region. In this
context, I suggest Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ approach as an insightful
theoretical framework that could help analyze how the Trump administration affected
a geopolitical transformation by moving the Arab states closer to Israel, hence
ushering a new geopolitical setting that favors US disengagement from the region and
that contains Iran’s growing influence.
Ryan (2015) underscores that the regional system in the Middle East was
subject to a plethora of “regional shocks” (para. 19) among which were: the Arab
uprisings, the collapse of certain regimes, the ongoing civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and
Libya, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. For Ryan, these “major jolts” (para. 1) destabilized
the regional system and triggered regimes in the region to take actions both
domestically and externally to maintain their security. Interestingly, these events
“have shaken the system of regional alliances and alignments” (para. 1), which, as I
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argue, represented an opportunity for the Trump administration to tailor its foreign
policies towards the Middle East. Accordingly, it altered the geopolitical landscape
and made new alignment choices possible and appealing to both the Arab regimes and
Israel. Ryan (2015) argues that regime security is the primary driver of alliance
politics in the region, particularly at the level of inter-Arab relations. He lays great
emphasis on the regime's domestic and external threats that lead its leaders to
reconsider alliance choices in the Middle East. In other words, regime insecurity for
the Arab rulers emanates from both their internal and external security dilemmas. The
Arab regimes are always obsessed with their survival, thus their perception of threats
invariably pushes them to shift policies both internally and externally.
It is in this context that, in reference to his research in 1995, Ryan argues that
“a regime security approach, rather than a Neorealist framework, better explained
Arab foreign policies and alliance choices” (para. 6). Ryan (2009, 2015, p. 7) slightly
refutes the macro- and system-level analyses of the Neorealist school in relation to
alliance and alignment formation in the Middle East. According to him, the
Neorealists do not provide sufficient empirical evidence that supports such theories
when applied to the region’s alignments. For instance, drawing on Carlos Escude’s
(1993) critique of Neorealism in ‘International Relations Theory: A Peripheral
Perspective’, Ryan remarks that Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) balance of power theory
draws heavily on Western-centric empirical grounds which are largely inapplicable to
the Middle Eastern realm. This inapplicability is due to the specificities of the
Western system of states. The latter is different from the Arab state system in terms of
certain notions such as the balance of power, alliances, and national security.
Similarly, in reference to ‘The Origins of Alliances’, Ryan (2009, 2015, p. 7)
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acknowledges that Stephen M. Walt (1987) contributes immensely to the literature of
Neorealism and alliance formation by enlarging the empirical study to encompass the
Middle East setting. Yet he points out that Walt largely underestimated the inter-Arab
dynamics in terms of the importance of domestic politics, ideology, and political
economy. He argues that Walt’s assumption of external security threat is too
deterministic while, empirically, alignments in the Middle East tell a different story.
In brief, Ryan maintains that the Neorealist views on alliance overlook the importance
of domestic political constraints by narrowing the scope of what constitutes a threat;
they eliminate non-military variables and stick to security threats as an external factor.
Equally important, most inter-Arab alignments may not even fit into the nature of
formal alliances as they might not entail “mutual defense pacts”. Therefore, Ryan
concludes that the Neorealist theories such as the balance of power and balance of
threat do not necessarily apply to inter-Arab politics. From another perspective, Ryan
relatively agrees with Steven R. David’s (1991) theory of ‘Omnibalancing’. The latter
is a reviewed version of balance of power theory and stresses the importance of
internal and external security threats behind alignment politics in the Third World.
Yet while he valorizes that ‘Omnibalancing’ takes into account domestic threats,
Ryan argues that the theory essentially addresses asymmetrical alignments; that is
alignments between Third World states and the superpowers.
Drawing on his extensive empirical work on Jordan as a case study, Ryan
(2009) finds that alignment choices in the Middle East were driven by three major
variables. The first variable is ‘external security’; it includes external threats of all
sorts. The second one is ‘domestic security’ which includes local opposition, social
discontent, domestic uprisings, etc. The third variable is ‘political economy’ which
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entails the need for economic partnerships and foreign aid, etc. These key
determinants, according to Ryan, are the driving engine of alignment politics in the
Arab world. He argues that they do not necessarily need to be all affected so that the
regime resorts to alignment. The most critical factor could direct the alignment
choices of the regime rulers. “Hence at times alignment decisions will be motivated
primarily by traditional security concerns. At others, the most pressing need may be
for economic support” (p. 14). Driven by these variables, regimes in the Arab world
choose either domestic or external alignments to ensure their survival.
Based on Ryan’s three variables, and given that many of the Arab regimes are
“security-obsessive” (p. 11), I suggest that his ‘security regime’ approach offers an
interesting theoretical framework on how the Trump administration affected a
geopolitical transformation in the region. Ryan’s theory seems relevant given that the
Arab-Israeli alignment was triggered by the Trump administration which brokered the
normalization of ties between the four Arab states and Israel. In other words, the
Trump administration tapped into Ryan’s variables to push the Arab regimes for a
security alignment with Israel. In a nutshell, in my discussion of the geopolitical
implications of the strategic shift of the Trump-era foreign policies, I attempt to test
the applicability of Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory on the Trump administration’s
approaches to the Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Chapter Four: Results
This empirical research systematically analyzed a corpus of 390 documents
revolving around the American foreign policy towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict under the Trump administration. In this chapter, I present in detail the final
findings of my research and provide evidence that supports them. Only important and
relevant findings related to my research questions are conveyed. Other results, such as
President Trump’s “Economic Plan” for Palestine, US bilateral relations with Middle
Eastern states, and fighting ISIS were also anticipated, yet they were not addressed
due to their irrelevance to the questions under investigation. As previously explained,
after coding the entire corpus, 3 major categories/themes emerged. Accordingly, I
display the results in a graph as appeared in the content analysis software (Figure 1).
Further, I synthesize the findings in a table for a better understanding of the
categorization of data (Table 1). Then, I support the findings with details from the
corpus to demonstrate how the codes and categories address my research questions.
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Figure 1: Final results of the corpus as shown in the content analysis software (Quirkos)

Table 1: Synthesized findings of the corpus after the content analysis on Quirkos

Category
The adoption of a
“Maximum Pressure”
campaign towards Iran

Code
Iran and its proxies as the common
threat
A catastrophic Iran Nuclear Deal
Explicitly criticizing the Obama
administration
Criticizing the previous
administrations
Countering Iran and its proxies
A mixture of multilateralism and
unilateralism

The adoption of a topdown approach

A rupture with the previous
approach

Synthesized finding
The Trump administration
portrayed Iran and its clients
as the common threat to the
US, Arab states, and Israel. It
unapologetically abandoned
the previous US approaches
towards Iran, especially the
rapprochement of the Obama
administration, and instead,
pursued a confrontational
strategy of “Maximum
Pressure” to confront Iran’s
alleged destabilizing activities
in the Middle East. The new
strategy espoused both
multilateralism and
unilateralism.
The Trump administration
firmly renounced the previous
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regarding the IsraeliPalestinian conflict,
President Trump’s
“Peace to Prosperity”
plan

The need for a new realistic
approach
Bridging the gap between the Arab
states and Israel (A topdown/“outside-in” approach)
Triggering a change in perception:
sharing common challenges and
interests
Economic and security
motives/incentives behind the
normalization of relations between
the Arab states and Israel
Ending the conflict

A mixture of multilateralism and
unilateralism
Triggering geopolitical
transformation to
confront Iran’s quest
for regional hegemony

Rebuilding trust

Rallying partners

Creating a geopolitical shift

peace initiatives to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and, instead, pursued a new
realistic and pragmatic
approach that was embodied in
the “Peace to Prosperity” plan.
The Trump administration’s
vision followed a top-down
“outside-in” approach to the
conflict by focusing on
bridging the gap between the
Arab states and Israel since it
suggested a plan that required
unimaginable concessions
from the Palestinians.
President Trump’s “Peace
plan” espoused both
multilateralism and
unilateralism that was often
inconsistent with international
consensus.
The American foreign policy
under the Trump
administration sought to
engender a geopolitical
transformation in the Middle
East. To achieve its aim, it
consistently worked on
rebuilding trust with US allies,
rallying up its partners, and
creating a new geopolitical
landscape. In other words, the
Trump administration
attempted to activate alliance
politics by aligning the Arab
states and Israel to balance
against Iran and its proxies in
the region.

In analyzing the corpus, findings revealed that data from the different types of
documents affirmed and fell in line with each other. Results were neither inconsistent
nor contradictory. On the contrary, they were consistent and indicative that the Trump
administration embarked on a strategic shift in the American foreign policy in the
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Middle East. This shift aimed to engender a novel geopolitical setting, based on a
GCC-Israeli security alignment, that balances against Iran's alleged aggression and
that favors US disengagement from the region.
4.1 The adoption of a “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran
4.1.1 Iran and its proxies as the common threat
Repeatedly evident within the corpus is how the Trump administration
perceived Iran as the greatest danger to US interests and allies. Throughout the
corpus, the Trump administration endlessly portrayed the Iranian regime and its
clients as the common threat, one that was behind all the mayhem that plagued the
Middle East. For the Trump administration, the Iranian regime and its aligned groups
represented the main source of instability in an already turbulent region. In his address
to the Arab Islamic American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump depicted
Iran as the common menace to the region. He said:
But no discussion of stamping out this threat would be complete without
mentioning the government that gives terrorists all three—safe harbor,
financial backing, and the social standing needed for recruitment. It is a
regime that is responsible for so much instability in the region. I am speaking
of course of Iran. From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains
terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and
chaos across the region.
In the “Peace to Prosperity” plan revealed in January 2020, the Trump
administration alerted the states in the Middle East to the geopolitical threat posed by
Iran. The plan stated that: “Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon,
Syria and Gaza, and encircle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen”
47

and that “Iran hopes to establish a “land bridge” that stretches from the Iran-Iraq
border to the Mediterranean Sea”.
4.1.2 A catastrophic Iran Nuclear Deal
Bashing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a prominent theme in
this research corpus. For the Trump administration, the Iran Nuclear Deal failed
spectacularly to address other aspects of Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region. It
was marred by a plethora of flaws and regarded as none other than a colossal mistake.
Throughout the corpus, the JCPOA drew a storm of criticism not only from the
President and his cabinet but also from the US Representatives, Senators, foreign
leaders from the Middle East, journalists, and think tanks. The JCPOA was
interchangeably referred to as “Obama’s dangerous Iran Nuclear Deal”, a “one-sided
deal that should have never, ever been made”, “nothing short of a foreign policy
debacle”, etc. It took the Trump administration less than a month to publish a joint
readout of the President's meeting with Israeli PM Netanyahu in which it stated that
“the two leaders agreed that the Iran nuclear deal was a terrible deal for the United
States, Israel, and the world”.
Dissatisfied with the JCPOA, President Trump, on October 13th, 2017,
announced a new strategy on Iran. It decided to decertify that Iran was abiding by the
terms of the JCPOA. 8 May 2018 marked the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.
Particularly noticeable in the corpus was the fact that not only the Trump
administration and American decision-makers that commended the US withdrawal
from it, the views of certain leaders in the Middle East also corroborated that the deal
was not in the best interest of the US and the region. PM Netanyahu lauded the
President’s “bold decision” to pull out from the deal. Similarly, the Kingdom of Saudi
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Arabia’s Ambassador to the United States Khalid bin Salman said that his country
“fully support[ed] the measures” taken by President Trump. In the same vein, Anwar
bin Mohammed Gargash, the Former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs affirmed
that the JCPOA was “a flawed deal” and that the decision of the President was “the
correct one”.
4.1.3 Explicitly criticizing the Obama administration
Throughout its mandate, the Trump administration poured harsh criticism on
the Obama administration, by directly blaming it, for its alleged poor handling of
Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East. Results showed that the Trump
administration’s discontent with the Obama administration was not only for its
rapprochement with Iran but also for its shaky and volatile policies towards the
regime of Bashar Al Assad, Iraq, and ISIS. With regard to Iran, in a fact sheet issued
on October 13th, 2017, the Trump administration criticized the shortsightedness of the
Obama administration for not addressing the different threats that Iran poses to US
interests and allies. It slammed the previous administration’s “myopic focus on Iran’s
nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime’s many other malign activities” that
destabilized the region. Regarding Syria, for instance, President Trump exposed the
Obama administration’s lack of resolve to punish the Al Assad regime for its alleged
use of chemical weapons against its people. When asked by a journalist, in April
2017, in a joint conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan, whether his
administration blamed the Obama administration for setting a red line to the Al Assad
regime and not following through, President Trump confirmed the question and
replied as follows:
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“Well, I think the Obama administration had a great opportunity to solve this
crisis a long time ago when he said the red line in the sand. And when he
didn’t cross that line after making the threat, I think that set us back a long
ways, not only in Syria, but in many other parts of the world, because it was a
blank threat. I think it was something that was not one of our better days as a
country. So I do feel that, Julie. I feel it very strongly”.
On October 30, 2020, a statement was published saying that: “On issue after
issue, President Trump reversed the disastrous foreign policy of the Obama
Administration and put the American people first”.
4.1.4 Criticizing the previous administrations
As far as the US entanglement in the Middle East is concerned, it was
noticeable that President Trump unequivocally expressed his disapproval of his
predecessors’ policies which, according to him, only further destabilized the region.
On April 5, 2017, in a joint press conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan,
President Trump commented on the US intervention in the region:
And so, as you know, I would love to have never been in the Middle East. I
would love to have never seen that whole big situation start. But once it
started, we got out the wrong way, and ISIS formed in the vacuum, and lots of
bad things happened.
He also added:
And I have to just say that the world is a mess. I inherited a mess. Whether it’s
the Middle East, whether it’s North Korea, whether it’s so many other things,
whether it’s in our country — horrible trade deals — I inherited a mess. We’re
going to fix it. We’re going to fix it”.
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In the same respect, Newt Gingrich, in an op-ed, entitled ‘The President Just
Made A Titanic Foreign Policy Shift’. The Media Missed It’, written for the
Washington Post and shared by the Trump administration on May 25, 2017,
confirmed that the President’s speech in the Arab Islamic American Summit on May
21, 2017 “implicitly repudiated the approaches of his two immediate predecessors” in
the region’s most pressing issues.
4.1.5 Countering Iran and its proxies
4.1.5.1 The need to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior
Throughout the corpus, it was abundantly clear that countering Iran’s activities
and proxies in the region was a foreign policy priority for the Trump administration.
According to a public statement published on January 22, 2017, President Trump’s
first call with PM Netanyahu after taking office stressed that both “agreed to continue
to closely consult on a range of regional issues, including addressing the threats posed
by Iran”. Following President Trump’s meeting with Deputy Crown Prince and
Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman
Abdulaziz Al Saud, on March 15, 2017, both stressed “the importance of confronting
Iran’s destabilizing regional activities”. As an example of the need to confront Iran’s
proxies, the Trump administration, in a public statement published on October 10,
2017, entitled ‘It’s Time to Mobilize a Global Response to the Terrorist Group
Lebanese Hizballah’, urged the US partners to work more on containing the group’s
actions.
4.1.5.2 President Trump’s New Strategy on Iran
According to the Trump administration, the JCPOA was flawed because it did
not tackle the entirety of Iran’s alleged malign behavior in the Middle East and the
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world. Therefore, “The Trump Administration’s Iran policy will address the totality of
these threats from and malign activities by the Government of Iran”. President
Trump's new strategy was inspired by the “peace through strength” previously
pursued by President Reagan and rejected rapprochement with Iran as the President
“understands the dangers of appeasement”.
The new strategy, issued on October 13, 2017, enumerated different objectives
to confront Iran’s behavior in the regions. First, it aimed at reviving regional alliances
and traditional partnerships to swing the balance against Iran. Second, it aimed at
denying the Iranian regime the financial wherewithal to fund terrorist activities and
proxies, in particular through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The
third objective was to protect against and confront the threats of ICBM missiles to the
US and its allies in the region. Fourth, the strategy aimed at mobilizing the
international community to condemn the Iranian regime’s infringement on human
rights including the unjust imprisonment of the US and foreign citizens. Fifth, and the
most important objective, the strategy aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. The “Peace to Prosperity” plan also pointed to the importance of
collectively countering the Iranian threat in the Middle East. For instance, the plan
urged the states in the region to “work together, along with the United States, to
protect the freedom of navigation through international straits that were increasingly
subject to the threat of Iran, its proxy forces, and terrorist groups”.
In his second address to the UNGA on September 25, 2018, President Trump
praised his administration’s “bold diplomacy” in mitigating the threats posed by the
Iranian regimes, among many other threats worldwide. Yet it seemed that the US was
willing to take military actions when it perceived a threat to its national security was
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“imminent”. That was the case with the killing of Major-General Qassem Soleimani,
head of the elite Quds Force, and the Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi alMuhandis on January 3, 2020.
4.1.5.3 Economic sanctions
Throughout the corpus, the reimposition of sanctions on the Iranian regime
along with its clients in the Middle East was a primary pillar that undergirded the
Trump administration’s new campaign of “Maximum Pressure”. Notwithstanding the
magnitude of sanctions that targeted the Iranian regime, results showed that US
sanctions were unilaterally asserted on Iran without the support of the EU nor the UN.
By November 5, 2018, all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA were fully reimposed by
the US, following its withdrawal from the deal in May 2018. Sanctions targeted,
among other sectors, banking, commerce, industry, energy, oil, and gas sectors in
Iran.
4.1.6 A mixture of multilateralism and unilateralism
Data showed that the US, in addressing Iran’s alleged malign activity in the
region, acted both multilaterally and unilaterally. What was noticeable is that the US
preferred to contain Iran and its clients outside the auspices of the United Nations.
Regarding multilateralism, the Trump administration, in its endeavor to overcome
what was regarded as a “disastrous” JCPOA, called exclusively the European allies
for the creation of a more holistic additional agreement that curbs Iran’s behavior. By
the same token, in a press briefing on January 12, 2018, a senior administration
official stated that: “I do want to stress also that this would not entail direct
negotiations with the Iranians, this would be something the United States works out
with our European partners only”. Interestingly, multilateralism did not convince the
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EU of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign which was eventually endorsed mostly by
Middle Eastern allies with whom the Trump administration closely consulted on the
Iranian containment throughout its tenure.
As far as unilateralism was concerned, the Trump administration unilaterally
recognized the Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Syrian territories captured
by Israel in the 1967 June War. In a proclamation of the decision issued on March 25,
2019, President Trump maintained that the territories have been historically used by
Iran and its clients in the region, such as Hizballah, to launch deadly assaults on
Israel. Therefore, it was “appropriate” for the US to recognize the territories as part of
Israeli sovereignty. In defending the US right to protect itself and pursue its interests,
President Trump frequently promoted the embrace of sovereignty. For instance, in a
fact sheet issued on September 24, 2019, the Trump administration put emphasis on
the importance of respecting American sovereignty. It said: “President Donald J.
Trump has shown that the path to prosperity and strength lies in lifting up our people
and respecting our sovereignty”. While the Trump administration was willing to
multilaterally forge an alternative Iran Nuclear Deal with the US partners, albeit
outside the auspices of the UN, the situation was totally different with Syria. Findings
showed that the Trump administration tried to reach a political solution to the Syrian
conflict through the United Nations Security Council. For instance, it always
emphasized the importance of the UNSCR 2254 and the United Nations-led Geneva
Process which urged a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement of the Syrian civil war.
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4.2 The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan
4.2.1 A rupture with the previous approach
Results demonstrated that the Trump administration was assertive in rejecting
what was considered archaic strategies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that proved to
be unproductive and fruitless. In a statement issued on December 6, 2017, on the
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, President Trump indicated that his
administration will abandon the unsuccessful policies of the past to avoid the historic
deadlock in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. He stressed: “We cannot solve our
problems by making the same failed assumptions and repeating the same failed
strategies of the past”. In the official signing ceremony for the peace agreements
between Israel and Arab states on September 15, 2020, President Trump reiterated
that: “These agreements prove that the nations of the region are breaking free from the
failed approaches of the past”. In short, the Trump administration was unequivocal in
abandoning the previous stances towards the conflict.
4.2.2 The need for a new realistic approach
Results showed that after renouncing the previous approaches to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the Trump administration advocated instead for the embrace of a
novel “realistic “approach that can potentially solve the chronic conflict. This new
approach was driven by pragmatic outcomes. In his address to the Arab Islamic
American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump declared that his administration
is “adopting a Principled Realism, rooted in common values and shared interests”. On
September 20, 2017, in his address to the 72nd United Nations General Assembly,
President Trump emphasized that his administration was “guided by outcomes, not
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ideology”. The “Peace to Prosperity” plan put emphasis on the importance of a
realistic solution to the long-standing conflict driven by pragmatic principles. For
Trump's “Vision”, “A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to
govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel”. On October 23, 2020, in his
remarks about the announcement of the normalization of ties between Israel and
Sudan, President Trump commented that: “We did it the opposite way — exactly the
opposite way”. In a nutshell, the Trump administration pursued a remarkably different
approach from its predecessors.
4.2.3 Bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel
Pertinent to the adoption of a new realistic approach, was how the Trump
administration consistently worked on bridging the gap between the Arab states and
Israel. This endeavor was noticeably persistent throughout the Trump era indicating
that the administration pursued a top-down “outside-in” approach to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. On February 15, 2017, less than a month after the administration
started its mandate, and during a joint press conference with President Trump, PM
Netanyahu stated that “we can seize an historic opportunity — because, for the first
time in my lifetime, and for the first time in the life of my country, Arab countries in
the region do not see Israel as an enemy, but, increasingly, as an ally”. President
Trump confirmed what the PM Netanyahu said in that “it is something that is very
different, hasn’t been discussed before. And it’s actually a much bigger deal, a much
more important deal, in a sense. It would take in many, many countries and it would
cover a very large territory”. In a Washington Post Op-Ed entitled “Could this be a
game-changer for Middle East peace?” and shared by the Trump administration on
August 25, 2017, David Ignatius wrote that “The Trump administration seems to
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envision an “outside-in” strategy for breaking the Palestinian-Israeli stalemate”. He
added that: “The opportunities for trade, investment, and security cooperation
between Israel and the Arabs have never been greater”. On January 22, 2018, in a
joint press statement between VP Pence and PM Netanyahu, the latter remarked that
Israel was ready to work with President Trump’s negotiation team “to advance peace
with all our neighbors, including the Palestinians”. In short, this affirms that the
Trump’s strategy to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict followed a top-down “outside-in”
approach.
4.2.4 Triggering a change in perception: sharing common challenges and
interests
Results suggested that bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel was
often articulated by reference to the depiction of Iran as the real threat to the region.
Put differently, triggering a change in perception of who represented the greatest
threat to stability in the Middle East was central to reconciling between the Arab
states and Israel. This meant that Israel throughout the corpus was presented as a
potential partner in confronting a plethora of common issues while Iran was depicted
as the main source of those issues.
In an op-ed shared by the Trump administration on September 4, 2018, Jason
Dov Greenblatt highlighted the link between Iran’s aggression in the region and the
need for a change in perception of what is the source of threat and who could be a
partner in confronting it. He wrote: “Confronted with an emboldened, aggressive
Iran...most leaders understand now that Israel is not the problem — indeed, the Jewish
state could be part of their solution”. The “Peace to Prosperity” plan repeatedly
argued that the Arab states should not perceive Israel as a threat. It emphasized that:
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“the State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions and
Iran’s malign activities, however, posed an existential threat to many of the region’s
states”. A rapprochement between the Arab states and Israel would yield fruits at a
myriad of levels, particularly at the level of security and economy. The plan insisted
that “Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to assist across a wide range of
economic challenges as well as counter the threats of Iran”. It highlighted that “The
State of Israel and the Arab countries have already discovered their common interests
in combating terrorist groups and organizations and the common danger posed by an
expansionist Iran” emphasizing that “These shared interest [sic] in the region should
be expressed in closer ties between the State of Israel and the Gulf Cooperation
Council”.
In highlighting the opportunities to confront common challenges and pursue
shared interests between the Arab states and Israel, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan
devoted a separate section entitled “Opportunities For Regional Cooperation”. In it, it
said: “In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously
unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging”. By bridging the gap between
the two parties, they can together pursue mutual interests and meet those threats. It
added: “The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime, for example, have led to a new
reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar
perceptions of the threats to their security”. The plan maintained that these new shared
interests and challenges required more cooperation and collaboration: “We have
entered a new chapter in the Middle East’s history, in which courageous leaders
understand that new and shared threats have created the need for greater regional
cooperation. The Trump Administration has strongly encouraged this”. Equally
58

important, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan devoted another separate section that
pinpointed the Trump administration’s “Vision For Peace Between the State of Israel,
the Palestinians, and the Region”. It encouraged the Arabs states to fully normalize
ties with Israel: “This Vision aims to achieve the recognition by, and normalization
with, those countries who do not currently recognize the State of Israel or have a
relationship with the State of Israel”. In a nutshell, findings suggested that there was a
correlation between the US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
the “Maximum Pressure” strategy and the top-down “outside-in” approach
crystallized in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Indeed, President Trump’s remarks
about the announcement of the normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan on
October 23, 2020, nicely encapsulated this correlation. He said: “Had we not done
what we did with Iran, this could never [sic] worked”.
4.2.5 Train of normalization
On August 13, 2020, in his remarks on the announcement of Israel-UAE
normalization of ties, President Trump pointed out that the Trump administration was
already discussing further normalization of ties between Israel and other Arabs states.
He said: “Now that the ice has been broken, I expect more Arab and Muslim countries
will follow the United Arab Emirates’ lead”. On August 31, 2020, a joint statement
stated that Israel carried out its first commercial flight to the UAE, flying over Saudi
Arabia, which carried Israeli decision-makers and media outlets. In his remarks
following the normalization of ties between Israel and Bahrain, Jared Kushner said:
“It was the first time in 72 years that Saudi Arabia has now waived their airspace to
allow commercial flights to fly from Israel back and forth”. In eulogizing the efforts
of the Trump administration, PM Netanyahu confirmed, on October 23, 2020, that the
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prospects for further normalization of ties with Arab states are indeed attainable and
within reach. He said: “Well, I want to say that we are extending the circle of peace so
rapidly with your leadership, Mr. President, your able team. History in the making.
Actually, we’re all making history — from the Emirates to Bahrain; now with Sudan
and other countries that are in line”.
4.2.6 Motives/incentives behind the normalization of relations between the Arab
states and Israel
In examining the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel, the
findings revealed that the motives and incentives were primarily twofold: economy
and security.
4.2.6.1 Economic motives/incentives to normalize ties between the Arab states
and Israel
Results showed that Israel was promoted and perceived as a potential
economic partner in the region. The economic aspect was always identified when
calling for the reconciliation of the Arab states with Israel. Some of the parties which
participated in the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop held in June 2019 in Bahrain were
all optimistic about the initiative. They considered the gathering of utmost importance
not only for the Palestinians but also for the broader region. On May 19, 2019,
Bahrain Minister of Finance and National Economy Shaikh Salman bin Khalifa Al
Khalifa said: “The ‘Peace to Prosperity’ workshop underscores the close strategic
partnership between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United States as well as the
strong and shared interest in creating thriving economic opportunities that benefit the
region”. In his remarks at the same workshop, Jared Kushner highlighted the
economic opportunities that await the region if the gap is narrowed between the Arab
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states and Israel. He said: “We can turn this region from a victim of past conflicts into
a model for commerce and advancement throughout the world”.
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan pointed out that economic conditions in the
Middle East “pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states”. It encouraged
the Arab states to forge economic ties with Israel to build stronger and more resilient
economies. It said: “The goal of this Vision is to have the Arab states fully cooperate
with the State of Israel for the benefit of all the countries in the region”. The plan
stressed that establishing economic ties with Israel would be mutually beneficial
“particularly given the interests of the Arab countries to move away from economies
based on fossil fuels to economies based on new infrastructure and technology”.
Equally important, cooperation included, among other things, direct flights between
the states which would help “to promote cross-tourism, and to better enable Arabs to
visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in Israel”. It also called for the integration of
transportation infrastructure which will transform the region into “a global hub for the
movement of goods and services from Asia to Africa and Europe”, in addition to the
wide range of deals that could be developed in trade. The peace deals between UAE
and Bahrain, and Israel signed on September 15, 2020, states that both states shall
seek cooperation and bilateral agreements in investment, technology, innovation,
trade, tourism, culture, energy, telecommunications, healthcare, environment,
agriculture, water, among several other areas of utmost importance to strengthen the
economy of these states. What was interesting was that the UAE-Israeli agreement
highlighted the importance of the “diversification of bilateral trade opportunities”
between the UAE and Israel.
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On October 23, 2020, the Republic of Sudan became the third Arab state that
normalized relations with Israel under the auspices of the Trump administration. It
was noticeable that the economic factor played an important role in such a peace deal
making it a “pragmatic and unique deal” as described by a statement on the matter.
Responding to a journalist's question, Secretary Pompeo said: “It made sense for the
Sudanese people to build out their economy, to create democratic institutions — all
the things that the Sudanese people have been demanding”. Equally important, on
December 11, 2020, the US-brokered peace between Israel and Morocco which both
agreed to normalize diplomatic ties. Same as Sudan, the peace deal between the two
states shed light on the mutual economic advantages while pointing out the security of
Israel. A fact sheet stated that: “This expansion of the Abraham Accords further
enhances Israel’s security while creating opportunities for the two countries to deepen
their economic ties and improve the lives of their people”. The deal will empower
Morocco to strengthen its bonds with the Moroccan Jewish community in Israel, as
well. On December 10, 2020, the US officially recognized Moroccan sovereignty over
the disputed Western Sahara territory. In a nutshell, the economic aspect factor was of
paramount importance and significance in the normalization of ties between the Arab
states and Israel.
4.2.6.2 Security motives to normalize ties between the Arab states and Israel
Repeatedly noticeable in the corpus was the security motive between the Arab
states and Israel. Indeed, the horizons of security cooperation were strongly present in
the very first joint statement by the Trump administration on the normalization of
relations between Israel and the UAE. The statement of the announcement on August
13, 2020, pointed out that both countries will meet in the coming weeks to sign
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bilateral agreements in myriad fields among which were technology and security.
Further, the statement declared that the three states will jointly create a “Strategic
Agenda for the Middle East” to bolster cooperation in diplomacy, trade, and security.
It also pointed out that the three states were committed “to promoting stability
through diplomatic engagement, increased economic integration, and closer security
coordination”.
In a second document published by the Trump administration on the day of the
announcement of the breakthrough between Israel and UAE, the fact sheet started
with a quote by President Trump which summed up the link between bridging the gap
between the Arab states and Israel and the importance of collective security: “Our
vision is one of peace, security, and prosperity—in this region, and in the world. Our
goal is a coalition of nations who share the aim of stamping out extremism and
providing our children a hopeful future that does honor to God”. The security field
was mentioned twice in the same document. The importance of security cooperation
with Israel was not exclusive to the UAE. The normalization of ties between Bahrain
and Israel on September 11, 2020, also highlighted the importance of such an
agreement on collective security. In a news clip, the Trump administration stated that
the decision “further enhances their security while creating opportunities for them to
deepen their economic ties”. In a fact sheet published on September 15, 2020, the
Trump administration reiterated that by bridging the gap between the Arab states and
Israel, “these agreements are leading to peace between Israel and the Middle East, as
well as increased security in the region”.
With relation to the establishment of diplomatic ties between Sudan and Israel
on October 23, 2020, what was noteworthy is that while Sudan benefited mostly from
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the economic advantages, as demonstrated in the previous section, this agreement
further served Israel’s security. The fact sheet stated that: “The expansion of the
Abraham Accords to include Sudan is a significant step that will further enhance
Israel’s security and create opportunities for Sudan and Israel to deepen their
economic ties and improve the lives of their people”. Lastly, one of the clauses of the
Abraham Accords Declaration stipulated that the signatory parties jointly embark on a
vision of mutual security for a peaceful and prosperous future. It said: “We pursue a
vision of peace, security, and prosperity in the Middle East and around the world”.
Briefly, similar to the economic one, the security aspect was of utmost importance
and significance in the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel.
4.2.7 A mixture of multilateralism and unilateralism
Similar to its approach to contain Iran, data showed that the US, in addressing
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, acted both multilaterally and unilaterally. What was
noticeable was that the US preferred to suggest a solution to the conflict that was most
of the time not in accordance with international consensus.
4.2.7.1 Multilateralism through “shuttle diplomacy”
Following a multilateral approach in which different parties were consulted,
the Trump team conducted a “shuttle diplomacy” in the region in an attempt to reach
a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a joint press conference
with President Trump on April 5, 2017, King Abdullah appreciated the engagement of
President Trump’s team and valorized their endeavor to consult with all parties
affected by a peace resolution. He said: “And so, his team had been in the region,
they’ve been talking to all the partners”. The “Peace to Prosperity” workshop held in
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June 2019 attested to the consultation with different parties in the region. Yet
multilateralism was eventually overridden by heavy doses of unilateral decisions.
4.2.7.2 Unilateralism: The US approached the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a
manner consistent with its national interests and not necessarily in accordance
with international norms
The Trump administration stressed that it would do whatever it takes, even
disregarding international norms, to defend US interests. In his address to the Arab
Islamic American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump declared: “We will
discard those strategies that have not worked—and will apply new approaches
informed by experience and judgment”. He added: “We will make decisions based on
real-world outcomes – not inflexible ideology”. In his remarks at the 2019 AIPAC
Policy Conference on March 25, 2019, VP Pence commented on the Trump
administration’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict saying: “Our
President made these decisions in the best interest of the United States”. The “Peace
to Prosperity” plan considered that approaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
through the UN bodies was ineffective and proved to be fruitless. It said: “Since
1946, there have been close to 700 United Nations General Assembly resolutions and
over 100 United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with this
conflict”. For the Trump administration, “these resolutions have not brought about
peace”. It points out how these resolutions were “sometimes inconsistent and
sometimes time-bound”. It also recalled how some of them were even ambiguous and
subject to “conflicting interpretations” from different states and legal scholars such as
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. In brief, the Trump administration
was upfront about its perception of how to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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The “Peace to Prosperity” plan unambiguously stated that the administration will not
rely on the UN bodies nor previous resolutions to come up with a realistic and
comprehensive plan for the chronic conflict. It maintained that:
this Vision is not a recitation of General Assembly, Security Council and other
international resolutions on this topic because such resolutions have not and
will not resolve the conflict. For too long these resolutions have enabled
political leaders to avoid addressing the complexities of this conflict rather
than enabling a realistic path to peace.
When it comes to criticizing the UN stances towards Israel, this was
repeatedly identifiable within this corpus. In a fact sheet entitled ‘President Donald J.
Trump Stands by America’s Cherished Ally Israel’ issued on March 25, 2019, the
Trump administration lambasted the UN’s “unfair treatment of Israel” stating that
“ For too long, Israel was the unfair target of biased and one-sided attacks at the
UN”. It highlighted the President’s decision to pull out from the UN Human Rights
Commission for showing “abhorrent anti-Israel bias”. Additionally, on different
occasions, the Trump administration took pride in cutting funds to the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) as it was plagued by
mismanagement and represented a hurdle in the peace process. In short, the Trump
administration was not enthusiastic about working with the United Nations nor
following international consensus. Instead, it criticized the UN agencies and
approached the Israeli-Palestinian conflict purely from the US national interests
perspective.
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4.2.7.2.1 On Jerusalem
The Trump administration unilaterally recognized Jerusalem as the
“undivided” capital of Israel. On December 6, 2017, in a presidential proclamation,
the President reiterated that the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-45),
urged the US to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocate the US
embassy to the new capital. This came after the US Senate voted unanimously on
June 5, 2017, to reaffirm the Act. To show support for President Trump’s decision to
recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Trump administration published a
statement on December 7, 2017, which included the views of US senators and
representatives, advocacy organizations, and Israeli officials such as the Prime
Minister and the President. What was noticeable was that there was no view of any
other foreign leader supporting the decision as was the case with other decisions such
as the creation of a new strategy on Iran or the withdrawal from the JCPOA. The
“Peace to Prosperity” plan came to insist that Jerusalem “should be internationally
recognized as the capital of the State of Israel”. For the State of Palestine, its capital
could be named “Al Quds” or any other name as determined by the State of Palestine
and should be internationally recognized.
4.2.7.2.2 On settlements
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan justified Israeli sovereignty over the territories
captured in the 1967 war as it viewed the latter as a defensive war. It stated that
“Withdrawing from territory captured in a defensive war is a historical rarity”. In his
remarks with PM Netanyahu on January 28, 2020, President Trump emphasized that:
“No Palestinians or Israelis will be uprooted from their homes”. PM Netanyahu
commented: “For too long — far too long — the very heart of the Land of Israel
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where our patriarchs prayed, our prophets preached, and our kings ruled, has been
outrageously branded as illegally occupied territory. Well, today, Mr. President, you
are puncturing this big lie”. However, for the Trump administration, as underscored in
the plan, Israel had to stop expanding existing settlements or build new ones. This was
part of the compromises that Israel had to make to enhance peace prospects with the
Palestinians. In relation to occupation, the corpus revealed that the Trump
administration throughout its mandate did not refer to or consider the Israeli
settlements as occupied Palestinian territories. In fact, even in the “Peace to
Prosperity” plan, occupation, as a term, is used by the Trump administration to signify
solely jobs and training.
4.2.7.2.3 On Refugees
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan pointed out that the chronic conflict between
the Arabs and the Israelis caused a refugee problem for both the Palestinians and the
Jews. It stated that “Nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced by the
Arab/Israeli conflict”. The plan reminded the Arab states of their “moral
responsibility” to integrate the Palestinians, the same way Israel integrated the Jewish
refugees. As for their return to Israel, the plan unambiguously stated that “There shall
be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of
Israel”.

In a nutshell, the decisions and characteristics of the Trump

administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict made it indeed unique and
distinct from the previous approaches.

68

4.2.7.2.4 Limited Sovereignty of the Palestinian State and the maintenance of the
security of Israel
Results showed that the statehood of the State of Palestine was often
envisioned in reference to the security of Israel. President Trump’s ‘peace plan’
places restrictions on the sovereignty of the State of Palestine that were, in the eyes of
the Trump administration, so important to maintain the security of Israel if a genuine
and lasting peace was desired by all parties. While the plan recognized that the
Palestinians “have a legitimate desire to rule themselves and chart their own destiny”,
it focused on the concept of self-determination at the expense of sovereignty. It
maintained that “Any workable peace agreement must address the Palestinians’
legitimate desire for self-determination” with no reference to Palestinian sovereignty
in case of a statehood. According to the plan, “Self-determination is the hallmark of a
nation. This Vision is intended to maximize self-determination while taking all
relevant factors into account.

Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved

over time”. The plan viewed sovereignty, as a concept, as not “static” and has no
definite and definitive definition. It was within this context that “A realistic solution
would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to
threaten Israel”. In short, for the Trump administration, a practical and lasting solution
to the Israeli security concerns “necessarily entails the limitations of certain sovereign
powers in the Palestinian areas”.
Regarding the new Palestinian state, the plan addressed the legitimate
aspirations of the Palestinian people through, among others things: the establishment
of the State of Palestine, assisting with building new infrastructure, strengthening
institutions, etc. At the same time, the plan placed particular importance on the
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security of Israel for it was “a country that since its establishment has faced, and
continues to face, enemies that call for its annihilation”. The plan expressed the
administration’s concern about the bellicosity of Hamas, noting that “a similar regime
controlling the West Bank would pose an existential threat to the State of Israel”.
If the Israelis and the Palestinians signed a peace agreement, Israel will be the
main responsible for the security of Palestine. This entailed that the Palestinians
would have to assume their responsibility in terms of their internal security.
Accordingly, Israel hoped to minimize its involvement inasmuch as Palestine took
matters into its own hands. Among the Israeli rights to maintain security and order
was the use of aerial technology such as drones. This will help to mitigate the Israeli
footprint in the Palestinian territories. Moreover, Israel retained its right to deny the
entry of weapons or any related materials that it deems dangerous to its security to
Palestine. Furthermore, Palestine was not allowed to enter any international
organization if Israel deems critical to its national security, be it; militarily, politically,
or judicially. In all cases, Palestine should obtain the consent of Israel before joining
any organization. In addition to that, Palestine was not allowed to make any
agreement, be it at the level of security, military, or intelligence, with any other
organization or state that put Israel’s security in peril. Similarly, it should be denied
the development of any military capability locally or externally that could endanger
Israel. Equally importantly, in case of any breach of these security premises, Israel
had the right to “engage in necessary security measures” to ward off any threat to its
national security. Last but not least, for security reasons, Israel exercised full control
and sovereignty on the Jordan Valley and the territorial waters. In a nutshell, the
Trump administration suggested tremendous restrictions on the requirements of the
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new Palestinian state which, unsurprisingly, did not meet the demands of the
Palestinians.
4.3. Triggering geopolitical transformation to confront Iran’s quest for regional
hegemony
Results suggested that the Trump administration worked towards triggering a
geopolitical transformation in the Middle East. For the administration, new emerging
threats required a shift in US strategies and regional dynamics. In this section, I
demonstrate how the Trump-era foreign policies in the region aimed at forging a new
geopolitical architecture by rebuilding trust with allies, rallying partners, and
eventually changing alignment patterns to confront the growing influence of Iran.
4.3.1 Rebuilding mutual trust
Data showed that the Trump administration vocally expressed its intentions to
rebuild mutual trust between the US and its partners and allies in the Middle East,
after what was viewed as a period of skepticism and uncertainty. On May 22, 2017,
the administration issued a statement reflecting the reaction of President Reuven
Rivlin of Israel upon President Trump’s arrival in Israel. President Rivlin said: “we
are happy to see, America is back in the area, America is back again.” On September
20, 2017, about his address to the 72nd United Nations General Assembly, a fact
sheet was issued stating that “The President is repairing relationships with Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and other key Middle Eastern allies and partners. In his remarks on
May 8, 2018, on the JCPOA, President Trump said: “Today’s action sends a critical
message: The United States no longer makes empty threats. When I make promises, I
keep them”. In his announcement of the normalization of relations between Israel and
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Bahrain on September 11, 2020, President Trump said: “I’ve restored trust with our
regional partners”.
4.3.2 Rallying partners
Throughout the corpus, findings demonstrated that the Trump administration
consistently rallied US partners to confront the Iranian threat to collective security and
regional peace. Indeed, the administration aimed at aligning the Arab states and Israel
and propelling them to form a security coalition to thwart the growing threat of Iran.
In a joint press conference with PM Netanyahu on February 15, 2017, President
Trump expressed his intentions to rally US partners and allies in the Middle East to
confront Iran’s aggression in the region. He said:
I think it’s — let me say this very openly: I think it’s long overdue, and I think
that if we work together — and not just the United States and Israel, but so
many others in the region who see eye to eye on the great magnitude and
danger of the Iranian threat, then I think we can roll back Iran’s aggression
and danger. And that’s something that is important for Israel, the Arab states,
but I think it’s vitally important for America.
President Trump pushed for a security alignment between the Arab states and
Israel in that the Arabs states needed to realize that they cannot always rely on the US
for their security. Instead, Israel might be a strategic solution and a reliable partner for
them in the long run. The Trump administration’s appeal for the security alignment
between the Arab allies and Israel also seemed to constitute a stepping stone for a
long-term strategic alternative for the US disengagement from the Middle East. In his
same address to the Arab Islamic American Summit, President Trump noted: “But the
nations of the Middle East cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for
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them. The nations of the Middle East will have to decide what kind of future they
want for themselves, for their countries, and for their children”.
On October 13, 2017, in outlining the new strategy on Iran, the Trump
administration noted that “We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional
partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion”. On May 8, 2018, in a fact sheet
about the US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, the Trump administration
reaffirmed that: “President Trump will work to assemble a broad coalition of nations
to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s
malign activities”. In a statement published on May 9, 2018, displaying the support
for President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal, it stated what
Secretary of State Pompeo said about the decision:
As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to find a real,
comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian threat. But our effort is
broader than just the nuclear threat and we will be working together with
partners to eliminate the threat of Iran’s ballistic missile program; to stop its
terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity across the
Middle East and beyond
In his remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on
September 25, 2018, President Trump said: “For that reason, the United States is
working with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan, and Egypt to establish a regional
strategic alliance so that Middle Eastern nations can advance prosperity, stability, and
security across their home region”. In the remarks of President Trump on the
announcement of normalization of relations between Israel and Bahrain on September
11, 2020, VP Pence recalled that: “Your very first foreign trip was to the Arab world
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— to reach out, to create new alliances”. In a joint statement by the US, Bahrain, and
Israel on October 19, 2020, the three states agreed that they will “advance a Strategic
Agenda for peace and prosperity in the Middle East” adding that they “are aligned in
their views on the challenges, threats, and opportunities present in the region”.
4.3.3 Creating a geopolitical shift
Allied to the Trump administration’s efforts to rebuild trust and rally partners
was its efforts to trigger a geopolitical shift in the Middle East. This shift was
achieved by pushing for a security alignment and altering the power dynamics in the
region. Findings suggested that by moving the Arab states closer to Israel, as
illustrated in the Abraham Accords, cooperation in the field of security could be a
turning point in altering the geopolitical arena where all parties have a deep interest in
rolling back Iran’s destabilizing behavior.
On October 13, 2017, the Trump administration issued a fact sheet hoping that
the “Maximum Pressure” strategy on Iran will “restore a more stable balance of
power in the region”. On January 22, 2018, in his remarks in the special session of the
Knesset, VP Pence appreciated that the region is undergoing a “remarkable
transformation” and stressed “the need to forge a new era of cooperation”. He also
added that: “The winds of change can already be witnessed across the Middle East.
Longstanding enemies are becoming partners. Old foes are finding new ground for
cooperation”.
In a separate section of the “Peace to Prosperity” plan entitled “New
Opportunities for New Regional Security Initiatives”, the Trump administration
pointed out the prospects of forming alliances to balance against the common threat of
Iran in the Middle East. It said: “In confronting common threats and in pursuing
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common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are
emerging”. It also recognized that “The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime, for
example, have led to a new reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors
now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security”. On
September 15, 2020, a fact sheet was issued affirming that the US is “facilitating a
regional transformation” in the Middle East and that “President Trump’s policies are
leading to the most rapid geopolitical transformation of the Arab world in more than a
generation”.
This regional transformation that the Middle East was witnessing was aimed
to benefit the interests of the US and its allies while curbing Iran and its proxies in the
region. On October 23, 2020, in the President’s remarks about the announcement of
the normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan, Brian Hook lauded the
“transformative diplomacy that has been led by the President” adding that “the
President has stood with Israel and countered Iran, and that has given space to our
Arab partners to move closer to Israel”. He also boasted that “with three peace
agreements, this is now the third defeat for Iran’s foreign policy, and it is another
victory for America”. In the same respect, President Trump said: “And I want to say
— one thing that I do see is an enthusiasm from most countries in the world, for most
people in the world — across the political divide. Yeah, Iran is unhappy. Hezbollah
is unhappy. Hamas is unhappy”.
The UAE-Abraham Accords Peace Agreement signed on September 15, 2020,
included clauses that demonstrate mutual interests between the parties notably in the
field of security cooperation, so important for the geopolitical shift that the Trump
administration envisioned. For instance, the agreement stated that the parties were:
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“Determined to ensure lasting peace, stability, security and prosperity for both their
States”. Further, the agreement stipulated that both parties will allow each other’s
cargoes and vessels to access each other’s different ports and that both “Parties shall
conclude agreements and arrangements in maritime affairs, as may be required”.
Additionally, security cooperation also included the energy field as “The Parties take
note of the strategic importance of the energy sector and in particular of their need to
promote… energy security”. Last but not least, the two parties “Reaffirm[ed] their
shared commitment to normalize relations and promote stability through diplomatic
engagement, increased economic cooperation and other close coordination”.
Similarly, the normalization of ties between Bahrain and Israel on September 11,
2020, also pointed out the importance of such an agreement on mutual security.
It should be stressed that after starting to see their efforts bear the fruit,
members of the Trump administration praised the consistency and vision of the
American foreign policy in the Middle East. In the President’s remarks on the
announcement of normalization of relations between Israel and the Kingdom of
Bahrain on September 11, 2020, Kushner said that this success was “the culmination
of a long period of time”. He added: “And all of the promises you made on that trip
and all of the things that you foreshadowed have occurred. It’s been a strategy that
you’ve stuck with”. Similarly, Brian Hook lauded the President’s strategy saying that:
you talked about the journey to get here. And I remember I heard you pledge,
when you were in Riyadh and when you were in Israel — you pledged that
you would strengthen America’s friendships and to build new partnerships in
the pursuit of peace. And you’ve kept that promise, and we see that very
clearly today.
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To conclude, my empirical data revealed that the Trump administration
embarked on two shifts in its foreign policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. It followed a confrontational “Maximum Pressure” campaign to better
contain Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region. The pursuit of this strategy is
considered as a much-needed approach after a period of rapprochement for which the
Obama administration was harshly criticized. The administration also pursued a topdown “outside-in” approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The “Peace to
Prosperity” plan came to convey President Trump’s vision of a new Middle East.
Interestingly, the entire approach focused on bridging the gap between the Arab states
and Israel. This was evident by stressing the importance of economic and security
cooperation between the Arab states and Israel while placing tough restrictions on the
would-be State of Palestine. The Trump administration also worked towards creating
a geopolitical transformation in the region. It rallied the US allies to form an alliance
or a coalition of states that would better contain Iran and its proxies in the region.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Using an inferential interpretive approach, data discussion in this chapter sets
out to understand the layers of meaning inherent in the research findings. First, I
attempt to develop a better understanding of the strategic shift identified in the
American foreign policy in the Middle East under the Trump administration. Second,
I attempt to generate insights into its geopolitical implications, the most important of
which is a burgeoning security alignment between the GCC states (UAE, Bahrain, and
even Saudi Arabia secretly) and Israel, so strategic to help thwart Iran’s growing
influence as the US recalibrates its engagement in the region. Research results were
relevant to my research questions and suggested that the policies designed towards
Iran and Israeli-Palestinian questions were correlated and both playing into the
dynamics of geopolitical transformation. What made the Trump-era foreign policies
strategic was the adoption of new approaches and the thoughtful pursuit of a
transformative geopolitical vision of the region. While other scholars and analysts
described the shift that marked the American foreign policy as “titanic” (para. 1) and
“decisive” (Gingrich, 2017, para. 8), and “significant” (Quamar, 2018, p. 273), my
findings suggested it was indeed strategic and had a transformative effect on regional
geopolitics in line with the US increasing retreat from the region. Pushing for a
security alignment between the GCC states and Israel may help the US, in the long
run, to switch into an “Offshore Balancing” strategy as it can rely more effectively on
key regional allies which by then would have developed an extensive experience of
security cooperation.
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first one is about the
adoption of a new confrontational approach regarding Iran: the “Maximum Pressure”
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campaign. The second one is about the adoption of a new top-down approach
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystallized in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan.
The third section is a discussion of the resort to both unilateralism and multilateralism
often in defiance of international consensus. The last section in the chapter is about
the geopolitical transformation engendered by the two policies towards Iran and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In it, I attempt to apply Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime
security’ theory.
5.1 The adoption of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran
The Trump administration unreservedly demonized Iran and its proxies in the
Middle East. It assiduously sought to reinforce the idea that Iran and its aligned
groups are the common arch-foe to the US and its allies. For the administration, Iran
and its clients have a long history of viciously targeting the security of the US and its
allies and, thus, are the ones to blame for the region’s plights. It is within this context
that the Trump administration championed the idea that the overall destabilizing
actions of Iran and its proxies, not just the nuclear portfolio, have been at the forefront
of its Iran strategy. In this regard, it relentlessly criticized the Obama administration’s
handling of issues ranging from the rapprochement with Iran to the use of chemical
weapons by the Syrian regime. In fact, the administration did not show any restraint in
indicting the previous administration’s rapprochement with Iran which allegedly gave
it a blank cheque to carry on its threatening behavior in the region. This included
Iran’s development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and funding terrorist
groups, among other malicious activities. It was as if the shortsightedness of the
American foreign policy was complicit in Iran’s pursuit of its hegemonic aspirations
in the region, much to the detriment of the US interests and the security of US allies.
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Based on its absolute dissatisfaction with the JCPOA, the Trump
administration, throughout its mandate, worked systematically to dismantle the US
rapprochement with Iran. It unilaterally pulled out from the Iran deal and reinstated
unilateral tough sanctions on the Iranian regime. Indeed, the Trump administration’s
“Maximum Pressure” campaign illustrates how the Trump administration opted for a
confrontational approach, quite different from the past US approaches, which used
dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation with the EU and the rest of the international
community. In particular, the Obama administration’s approach advocated fervently
for diplomatic engagement with Iran, as shown in the ‘Historical background and
literature review’ chapter. On Trump's approach, Quamar (2018) affirms that
“Undoubtedly, it is a clear departure from the Obama’s policy of a nonconfrontationist approach” (p. 284). This shift, which I discuss in-depth in the fourth
section of this chapter, is a vital part of Trump's vision to push for geopolitical
transformation, hence Arab-Israeli security alignment.
5.2 The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan
The Trump administration has shrewdly focused on bridging the gap between
the Arab states and Israel. It heavily invested in a top-down “outside-in” approach,
quite different from the US previous approaches. The restrictions imposed on the
future Palestinian state prove that the administration was focusing on reconciling
between the Arabs states and Israel, in lieu of pushing for direct negotiations between
the Israelis and the Palestinians. This proves that the ‘Land-for-Peace’ formula was
not that appealing for both the Trump administration and Israel since they could
engineer a much more magical deal based on a ‘Peace-for-Peace’ principle.
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The severity of the restrictions on the sovereignty of the envisioned State of
Palestine makes it unlikely that the Palestinians would seriously consider the plan
given their vehement embrace of the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and the
numerous UNSCRs. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Trump administration tailored
such restrictions in the ‘peace plan’ on purpose perfectly knowing that the
Palestinians will unapologetically reject it, thus exposing their inflexibility and
intransigence in the peace process. By portraying the Palestinians’ unalterable stance,
across the different factions and orientations, as a hinder towards lasting and
comprehensive peace, the Trump administration paved the way for the Arab states to
break away from the Palestinian’s sheer obstinacy and chart a new path for their
regimes. It is worth remembering that, “Without doubt”, former President Jimmy
Carter asserted, “the path to peace in the Middle East goes through Jerusalem” (as
cited in Totten, 2016, p. 28). The Trump administration did exactly the opposite. It
disregarded the need for a genuine breakthrough between the Israelis and the
Palestinians and shifted instead its focus on the wider issues, on which the US has a
certain amount of leverage, between some of the Arab states and Israel.
The plan demeans any future peace prospect between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, one that is genuine, realistic, and lasting. It killed the ‘Land-for-Peace’
principle that the Palestinians demand for serious negotiations, a principle that also
underlies the Arab Peace Initiative. Odeh (2020) corroborates that the Israel-UAE
rapprochement, encouraged by the Trump administration, leads to the marginalization
of Palestinian rights. In her words, “The UAE-Israel deal ushers in an alliance that
defies traditional common denominators and sidelines the Palestinian cause” (para. 7).
The reaction of the Palestinians against the “Peace to Prosperity” plan and the
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Abraham Accords came to corroborate the top-down approach that characterized the
Trump administration’s initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ferziger
and Bahgat (2020) point out that the plan failed to relaunch peace talks between the
Israelis and the Palestinians as the latter immediately and categorically rejected it.
Indeed, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas described the plan as the
“smack of the century”, asserting that the unjust plan strives to “liquidate the
Palestinian issue” (Neuman & Kennedy, 2020, para. 10).
Yet, looking appealing, the plan had active listeners among certain Arab states
who welcomed it with open arms. Indeed, by the end of its tenure, the President’s
approach started to bear fruit with refueling the train of normalization that kickstarted
with Egypt in 1978. While the UAE claims that the peace deal with Israel would help
halt Israeli settlements, thus narrowing the gap between the Israelis and Palestinians
to sit on the table and relaunch the peace process, scores of analysts note that the
Abraham Accords are not peace deals since none of the signatory Arab states have
been in war with Israel. For instance, Guzansky and Marshall (2020) write: “There are
no territorial disputes between them, nor any grievances or accounts to be settled
between their political elites or peoples” (p. 383). The same applies to the Bahraini
case.
It is no secret that, prior to the normalization of relations, certain Arab states
forged warm relations with Israel. According to Guzansky and Marshall (2020),
Bahrain had already ended its boycott of Israel in 2005, and how the leaked
documents of Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa in WikiLeaks had illustrated
his official order to stop referring to Israel as the “Zionist entity” (p. 381). Erdoğan
and Habash (2020) underscore that some of the Gulf states were central in the
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promotion of the “Deal of the Century” especially Bahrain which hosted the “Peace to
Prosperity Workshop” in Manama in 2019. Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) affirm that the
discretion of ties between the Gulf states and Israel began to ease before the
normalization of ties. They recall how former Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman
welcomed Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in his palace in late 2018 and how Israel
will partake in the World Expo hosted by the UAE in 2021 indicating that “the Jewish
state’s presence is becoming more overt in places where it was previously kept quiet
or outright barred” (p. 2). In the same context, in 1996, Oman and Qatar established
trade offices for commercial relations with Israel, even though they were shut down in
2000 in solidarity with the Palestinians following the Second Intifada. In short,
reinvigorating the train of normalization with Israel seems to have shattered the Israeli
taboo. While one might wonder that this was already the case with Egypt and Jordan
in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Yet while Egypt and Jordan shared borders and a
history of war and hostility with Israel, the UAE was not subject to these factors.
Regarding the Saudi stance towards the rapprochement with Israel, it appeared
more lenient even though it gave mixed signals. On the one hand, it most probably
gave the green light for Bahrain and UAE to move ahead with the normalization of
relations. On the other hand, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, just a
few days after the announcement of the deal between Israel and UAE, stressed the
need to settle the Palestinian question first in accordance with the Arab Peace
Initiative put forward in 2002 before normalizing ties (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020).
Overall, one could deduce that the new leadership of Saudi Arabia, with the Crown
Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, also known as MBS, as the de facto ruler, seems to
be more lenient towards détente with Israel. Indeed, in his visit to the US in April
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2018, he was upfront in his stance towards Israel and declared that both the Israelis
and Palestinians have “the right to have their own land” (Goldberg, 2018, para. 7). In
the same visit to the US in April, during his meeting with certain Jewish groups, MBS
commented that the Palestinians should “accept Trump proposals or shut up’ after
slamming their rejectionist stances to previous peace initiatives (Al Jazeera, 2018,
title).
Other states unequivocally rejected the top-down approach such was the case
with Kuwait. According to Al-Qabas, a Kuwaiti newspaper, Kuwaiti government
sources assured that Kuwait’s firm stance on normalizing relations with Israel is
“fixed and will not change” (as cited by The New Arab Staff, para. 2, 2020a). As far
as Iran’s reaction is concerned, Iran’s IRGC condemned in the strongest terms the
normalization of ties between UAE and Israel and warned that such a deal would lead
to a “dangerous future” (para. 7) for the UAE. For its part, the government-allied and
ultra-conservative newspaper Kayhan wrote what was considered as a threatening
warning: “The UAE’s great betrayal of the Palestinian people…will turn this small,
rich country, which is heavily dependent on security, into a legitimate and easy
target” (as cited by Shepp, 2020, para. 7).
5.3 American foreign policy with a heavy dose of unilateralism
Throughout its mandate, the Trump administration was scathingly critical of
the United Nations with its different agencies. On several occasions, it eschewed
working with the UN in addressing some of the most pressing issues in the Middle
East: Iran’s alleged malign activities and the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
However, on other issues such as the Syrian civil war, the administration did not
object to pushing for a diplomatic political solution, under the auspices of the UN,
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simply because the war in Syria did not represent a US foreign policy priority. In what
follows, I discuss the Trump administration’s embrace of unilateralism that often
contradicted international norms.
5.3.1 On Iran
Although the Trump administration took a unilateral decision in shredding the
JCPOA, it undeniably consulted with its regional partners, among which were Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Accordingly, the administration seemingly changed the US
multilateral mechanism in its containment of Iran in that it sidelined both the United
Nations and the European allies, both constituted pillars in the last 2 decades in
negotiating with Iran, as discussed in the Second Chapter. Yet following the US
withdrawal from the JCPOA, the UN and EU, among others, voiced their regret on
the unilateral decision. The UN Secretary-General presented a report, ‘(S/2018/602)’,
on June 12, 2018, reiterating that resolution 2231, in favor of the JCPOA, was fully
implemented and respected by Iran. The report confirmed that Iran “has been
implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action” and considers the US withdrawal from the deal a “setback” to the whole
process (UN Secretary-General, 2018, p. 1). Similarly, the EU expressed its deep
regret of the US unilateral move highlighting that the JCPOA “is the culmination of
12 years of diplomacy which has been working and delivering on its main goal”
(Council of the European Union, 2018, para. 5). This clearly indicates that, in the
Trump era, the United Nations was sidelined and the Europeans were replaced by the
US closest allies in the region.
As part of its sustained effort to thwart the JCPOA, the US suggested, in
August 2020, a draft resolution ‘(S/2020/797)’ to the UN Security Council which
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would extend the restrictions on Iran regarding arms set to expire in October 2020.
The US failed, however, to pass the resolution with only the US and the Dominican
Republic voting in favor, while China and Russia vetoing the draft, and the remaining
Council members abstaining from voting. In the same month, the US tried to
reimpose the pre-2015 UN sanctions by invoking its “snapback” (para. 6) right under
the JCPOA but failed once again (Scheffer, 2020). Hence, even though the US actions
were taken through the UN Security Council, there were yet again unilateral moves by
the Trump administration which only resulted in more isolation of the US on the
world stage.
Further, in another effort to contain Iran and its proxies, the Trump
administration unilaterally recognized the Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights,
a decision that spawned worldwide criticism. Members in the UN Security Council
vocally expressed their regret over the decision with the EU members stating that
“Annexation of territory by force is prohibited under international law,” reaffirming
that unilateral annexation of other territories is in defiance of “the rules-based
international order and the UN Charter” (as cited in Deutsche Welle, 2019, para. 6). It
is worth remembering that, following the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 497 on December 17, 1981, in which it
highlighted that “the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible” (PP 2). Besides,
it unequivocally recognized the captured territories as “occupied Syrian Golan
Heights” and that Israeli’s control over the area “is null and void and without
international legal effect” (OP 1). Equally important, the resolution stipulated that
“Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision” (United Nations,
1981, OP 2).
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To conclude, the Trump administration’s espousal of unilateralism regarding
Iran manifested itself in the withdrawal from the JCPOA, the reimposition of
economic sanctions, the suggestion of security council resolutions, and recognition of
Israel’s sovereignty on the Golan Heights. These moves were testimonial to the
assertive and confrontational aspect of the Trump administration approach regarding
Iran, yet they were at the same time self-isolating actions in the international arena.
Indeed, using diplomatic means, the EU and the international community resorted to
‘soft balancing’ against the US as a response to its unilateralism as expected by Pape
(2005). Certainly, these moves marked a shift from the past approaches where the US
worked closely with its international partners, especially the EU, to address Iran’s
nuclear program and growing influence in the Middle East.
5.3.2 On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
After the repeated renunciation of the past approaches in handling the
longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it became crystal clear then that the Trump
administration would take a different path driven by a “realistic” and “pragmatic”
regional approach. In dealing with the conflict, the Trump administration touted itself
as a unique deal maker and peace broker. However, for the administration, in order to
be successful, it should be unshackled by the failed approaches of the past, even
though at the expense of international norms, which, according to the administration,
used to hinder the peace process. Indifferent to these constraints, President Trump
took a number of unilateral decisions regarding Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the
West Bank, the Palestinian refugee question, but also a wide range of other issues that
drew a flurry of criticism leading many to question the US role as a neutral peace
broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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When the Trump administration overturned decades of American foreign
policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by recognizing Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel, it faced widespread criticism from the international community,
including the closest allies of the US. The unilateral recognition of Jerusalem broke
with a longstanding international consensus that the status of Jerusalem should remain
unresolved until the Israelis and the Palestinians find a common ground to resolve it.
Similarly, on December 21, 2017, the overwhelming majority in the UN General
Assembly voted for resolution ‘GA/11995’ which rebuked the Jerusalem decision by
the Trump administration. As a response to that, the US threatened the states who
voted in favor of the resolution with punitive actions such as cutting foreign aids
(Fassihi, 2017). With the US standing alone in defending its unilateral decision, it
used its veto to reject a security council resolution on the matter. Yet the fact that all
members in the council except the US voted to adopt the resolution drew the attention
of scores of analysts who regarded the vote as a rebuke to the Trump administration’s
unilateral decision. Gladstone (2017) writes:
The rebukes, made at an emergency Security Council meeting called over Mr.
Trump’s announcement, constituted an extraordinarily public denunciation of
American policy on the world’s most prominent diplomatic stage, leaving the
United States alone on the issue among the council’s 15 members. (para. 2)
Regarding the question of settlements, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan does not
view Israeli settlements as illegal. On the contrary, it recognizes and endorses Israeli
sovereignty over large swathes of areas in the West Bank. It runs counter to the
international consensus on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In addition to the Arab
world, the EU, a close ally to the US, condemned the US policy reversal on the Israeli
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settlements. In a statement, the EU reaffirmed its “clear” and “unchanged” stance that
“all settlement activity is illegal under international law and it erodes the viability of
the two-state solution and the prospects for a lasting peace” (para. 1). The EU also
urged Israel “to end all settlement activity”, referring to it as the “occupying power”
(Mogherini, 2019, para. 2). In the same vein, UNSCRs which condemn the Israeli
settlements are numerous. By way of example, Resolution 446 adopted on March 22,
1979 “Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in
the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity”
(OP1) and demands Israel, referring to it as “the occupying Power”, “to abide
scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention” (United Nations Security
Council, 1979, OP3).
As far as the refugee question is concerned, it was thrown under the bus as the
administration advocated for a no-return solution. In the same respect, it cut US
funding for the UNRWA. These constituted decisive policies never advocated before
by the previous US administrations. Unilateralism was also manifested in other issues.
The Trump administration took a set of additional decisions in an attempt to increase
the pressure on the Palestinian Authority to come to the negotiating table with Israel.
It closed the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, and ended US
aid to Palestinians, in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. To sum up, the
adoption of unilateralism testifies to the abandonment of not only US past stances, but
also international consensus regarding some of the most complicated issues in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, the Trump decisions could hinder genuine
peace prospects of a two-state solution in the future.
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5.3.3 The rationale behind the Trump administration disregard of international
institutions and norms
The administration perceived international institutions as not conducive
neither to the American interests nor to any realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Equally disturbing for the Trump administration, the UN bodies discriminate
against Israel, its closest ally in the region. Therefore, it took the international
constraints out of its equation and let its foreign policy be driven purely by its own
national security considerations. The Trump administration’s neglect to address global
issues through international institutions emanates from its espousal of what the
administration termed “principled realism” and its promotion of the notion of
“sovereignty”. Powaski (2019, p. 247) argues that the 2017 National Security Strategy
stresses the pursuit of the US national interests and that the best way to protect them is
not through the conventional international institutions, but rather through inter-state
sovereign relations. For Powaski, the strategy “acknowledges the centrality of power
in international politics”, ergo the emphasis of the Trump administration on the
importance of the Realist school in international relations.
Ettinger (2020) expounds on the administration's emphasis on the need to
respect US sovereignty. The Trump administration incarnates “populist sovereignty”
(p. 411) in the sense that it is the moral duty and responsibility of the administration
to protect the American nation and preserve its interests, regardless of the
international constraints. In this respect, stressing the need to fully embrace
sovereignty falls in line with the underpinnings of the Jacksonian school of American
foreign policy which does not show any restraint in slashing international
commitments that curtail US freedom to defend its interests. Ettinger indicates that
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President Trump’s speeches, in addition to the 2017 National Security Strategy, are
illustrative of the “fidelity to popular sovereignty and the conservative case for
rejecting international law and governance” (p. 423). This is also affirmed by Cha
(2016). In the same vein, Ashbee and Hurst (2019) corroborate that the National
Security Strategy, which holds international cooperation in suspicion, stressed the
idea of competition between nations with the term “competition” (p. 10) employed
eighteen times. Yet Ettinger notes that the US rejection of international institutions is
not something new. He recalls how the US Congress, in the 20th century, firmly
rejected the US participation in the League of Nations and that such a decision was
“driven by concerns over international restrictions on American freedom of action”
(p. 423). In a nutshell, the Trump administration defended its sovereign right to act in
the best interest of the US even if it was at the expense of US international
commitment and norms.
5.4 Triggering geopolitical transformation: An Arab-Israeli security alignment
to confront Iran’s quest for regional hegemony
As the US continues to disengage from the region, the Trump administration
embarked on a strategic shift in the American foreign policies towards Iran and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to catalyze a geopolitical transformation in the region. This
resulted in laying the ground for an Arab-Israel security alignment to better balance
against Iran’s growing influence. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the
first section, I apply the strategic shift of Trump-era American foreign policy on
Ryan’s three variables behind the Arab-Israeli alignment. In the second section, I
discuss the geopolitical implications of Trump-era policies. Firstly, I outline the

91

features of this potential Arab-Israeli security alignment. Secondly, I showcase how
the geopolitical struggle could raise tensions in the Persian Gulf.
5.4.1 Application of Ryan’s three variables on the Trump administration’s
approach to the Arab-Israeli alignment.
According to Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory (2009, 2015), there are three
variables that could put the security of the Arab regimes at risk: ‘domestic security’,
‘political economy’, and ‘external security’. To ensure their security, Arab regimes
tend to shift their external alignments. In attempting to apply Ryan’s theory to the
study, I found ‘external security’ as the most pressing variable that the Trump
administration played into to push for the Arab-Israeli alignment. This was followed
by the ‘political economy’ variable, with no reference to the ‘domestic security’
variable at all. I suggest Ryan’s framework as informative theoretical lenses through
which the Trump administration’s approach towards the American foreign policy in
the Middle East could be explored.
5.4.1.1 The ‘domestic security’ variable
This factor was not identified in the data findings. Results did not reveal that
the Trump administration nor the Arab leaders addressed domestic threats to their
regimes. However, the Arab-Israeli alignment helps the Arab rulers to maximize their
internal security. In other words, domestic security could benefit from the alignment
decision with Israel and did not cause it, according to my corpus findings. Ryan
maintains that Arab alignment choices have “domestic consequences, often bolstering
existing authoritarian systems and thwarting hope for greater domestic change (2015,
para. 9). Accordingly, to fortify their regimes from internal threats, the Arab regimes
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could benefit from alignment with Israel to strengthen their security apparatus. Given
that technological cooperation is stipulated in the Abraham Accords, the Gulf regimes
could take their existing cooperation with Israel in this field to a higher and more
sophisticated level. In this respect, not only counter-terrorism efforts could flourish,
but also repressing critics and opponents could also intensify. There is already a litany
of reports that state that Israel has provided GCC states with highly sophisticated
surveillance technology that they use to spy and crack down on political dissidents
(Bergman, 2016; Mazzetti et al., 2019; Zilber, 2019). Regarding the UAE, it could
make most of the Israeli expertise in the field of technology so that it tightens its grip
on the opposition voices, especially the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated activists, that
were emboldened by the Arab Spring under the watch of the Obama administration.
The same applies to Bahrain. It could benefit tremendously from the technological
prowess of Israel to purchase surveillance software and devices to stifle the Shia
opposition groups that led the 2011 uprising and continue to represent a domestic
threat to the Al Khalifa regime. In short, by aligning with Israel, Arab regimes could
benefit from the Israeli technological know-how to fend off internal security threats,
even though the ‘domestic security’ factor was neither raised by the Arab leaders nor
explored by the Trump administration according to my corpus results.
5.4.1.2 The ‘political economy’ variable
For many Arab regimes, Israel represents a potential economic partner to
diversify and boost their economies. For its part, the Trump administration capitalized
on the ‘political economy’ factor. The most illustrative case was Sudan. It is mired in
a deep economic crisis and critically needs to relieve its ballooning debts. It also
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suffers from social unrest. Thus, the US decision to remove Sudan from the State
Sponsors of Terrorism list represented an incentive to align with Israel. This helped
Sudan lift the US sanctions and put an end to three decades of international isolation.
Indeed, in announcing the normalization of relations between Sudan and Israel on
October 23, 2020, President Trump remarked that Sudan’s peace agreement with
Israel will “end Sudan’s long isolation from the world”. Moreover, both the United
States and Israel will help Sudan unlock its economic potential by helping it “restore
Sudan’s sovereign immunity and to engage its international partners to reduce
Sudan’s debt burdens”, a joint statement released on October 23, 2020, affirmed.
Furthermore, Israel launched economic and trade relations with Sudan with a
particular focus on agriculture, so important for food security in Sudan. In a nutshell,
the ‘political economy’ determinant, including foreign aids, investment, and the need
for social stability, seems to be instrumental in pushing Sudan to align with Israel, a
factor the Trump administration capitalized on to approach the Israeli-Sudanese
alignment.
As for the GCC regimes, economic diversification is vital to overcome the
existing economic challenges as recommended by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). On the prospects of the oil sector in the Middle East, the latter released a study
in early 2020 entitled The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region.
In it, Mirzoev et al. (2020) alert the Gulf Cooperation Council to the probability that
“global oil demand could peak as early as 2030” (p. 12) due to the increasing use of
renewable energy and the growing danger of climate change, among several other
factors. Thus, they recommend that the six GCC member states embark on and
accelerate the deep economic reforms which would be necessary to eschew an
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economic crisis. Mirzoev et al. warn that “the region’s aggregate net financial wealth,
estimated at $2 trillion at present, would turn negative by 2034 as the region becomes
a net borrower” (p. 21). Given that an oil crisis is in the offing, it is crucial for the
Gulf regimes to find new alternative ways to avoid a multidimensional economic
crisis, hence, the importance of forging economic ties with Israel. In light of their
sensitive nature as ‘rentier’ states, ensuring strong economies will help the GCC
regimes better address social dissatisfaction and navigate popular demands for
political reforms especially after the recent waves of the Arab Spring.
In the same vein, Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) point out that the GCC states
could tremendously benefit from cooperation with Israel in the field of agriculture.
Israel has also one of the most creative and advanced projects in water-management
and irrigation fields, both sectors the GCC states need to cultivate given the scarcity
of water in these countries. Jones and Guzansky (2017) point out the continuity of
Arab-Israeli cooperation in such fields even in times of diplomatic ruckuses. They
state that even though Oman closed the Israeli trade office that it had opened in 1996,
it continued to welcome Israeli scientists to the Middle East Desalination Research
Centre (MEDRC) located in Muscat to tackle the water scarcity from which the
region suffers.
To conclude, as demonstrated in the corpus findings, the Trump administration
stressed that forging and nurturing economic cooperation with Israel will help the
Arab regimes upgrade their economic sectors, thus helping them generate more
economic growth and prosperity. The Arab regimes may find it strategic to cooperate
with Israel in a variety of fields ranging from energy, trade, water, to agriculture,
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health, etc. This was evident in the bilateral peace deals of the Abraham Accords.
Hence, the threat of social discontent, which swept the Middle East in the last decade,
that could put the legitimacy of the Arab regimes in jeopardy, could be minimized.
This attests to the relevance of Ryan’s variable of ‘political economy’ in the
normalization of ties between the Arab regimes and Israel and how the Trump
administration approached this important factor. In fact, to facilitate economic
cooperation and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Arab
regimes and Israel, the Trump administration pursued a top-down “outside-in”
approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as previously discussed. That was
why the Trump approach constituted a strategic shift in the American foreign policy
in the Middle East.
5.4.1.3 The ‘external security’ variable
According to Ryan, when faced with external threats, regimes tend to reorient
their foreign policies by forging new alignments or realignment. UAE and Bahrain
serve as two cases in point. Both are aligning with Israel to confront the external
menace posed by Iran and its proxies across the Middle East. To put things into
perspective, over the last two decades, the Iranian regime has tremendously benefited
from the unstable situation in the Middle East. It took advantage of a post-invasion
Iraq marked by inter-sectarian rifts, an Arab Spring that sent shockwaves across the
region, and civil wars in Syria and Yemen to consolidate its influence in the Arab
world (Dazi-Héni, 2020). In fact, in 2014, Ali Reza Zakani, an Iranian Member of
Parliament, close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, proclaimed: “Three Arab capitals
have today ended up in the hands of Iran and belong to the Islamic Iranian revolution”
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adding that “Sanaa has now become the fourth Arab capital that is on its way to
joining the Iranian revolution” (The Middle East Monitor, 2014, para. 1). Azodi
(2020) mentions that certain Iranian officials acknowledge that Iran’s growing foreign
activities instilled fear and terror in the Arab states and drove them to seek a security
umbrella in Israel. She cites the tweet of Ali Motahari, a former Iranian MP, who
writes:
Aside from Emiratis’ treacherous act, we also deserve some blame. We have
scared the Arabs and pushed them towards Israel. An example of this is
storming the Saudi embassy and setting it ablaze. The policy of making Iran
the enemy has been fruitful. This needs to be remedied. (para. 5)
As previously discussed, Iran and its allied groups have been systematically
demonized by the Trump administration which depicted them as an existential threat
to the external security of the Arab regimes. The Trump administration tapped into the
fears of the US regional allies of rapprochement with Iran. It alerted them to the grave
danger of once again appeasing the Iranian regime by repeating the same colossal
mistakes of the Obama administration should they think to engage with Iran. The
Trump administration strategically burnt bridges between the Arab regimes and Iran
while building ones with Israel. It persistently worked to entrench the perception that
the underlying external security threat facing the Arab regimes emanated from no
other sources other than Iran and its proxies while pushing the Arab regimes to
rethink their stance towards Israel. Focusing on the convergence of interests between
the Arab states and Israel helps the US administration deepen the negative perception
about Iran while promoting a positive image of Israel. The Trump administration
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tends to lock the Arab states into existential binary views—Iran as a destructive and
revisionist regime and Israel as a status quo power and multi-dimensional potential
partner. The stance of the Former Minister Anwar Gargash came to prove the
development of the negative perception of the Iranian regime. In an interview with the
Associated Press, he remarked that the decades-long Iranian aggression in the region
has pushed the Arab states to rethink their perception of Israel (cited by Lederer,
2020). The Trump administration seemed to have capitalized on that perception.
In a nutshell, branding the Iranian regime as the arch-enemy of the Arab
regimes and Israel was hoped to drive them closer to each other to form a security
alignment that fends off the Iranian threat. By demonizing Iran and maintaining the
confrontational campaign of “Maximum Pressure”, the Trump administration proved
that Iran and its proxies remain perceived as the real external threat to the security of
the Arab regimes, despite the dangerous rapprochement previously pursued by the
Obama administration. That was why the “Maximum Pressure” constituted a strategic
shift in the American approach towards Iran.
To conclude, my interpretation suggests that the Trump-era foreign policies
towards Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict were approached based on the ‘external
security’ and ‘political economy’ variables suggested by Ryan’s ‘regime security’
theory. In fact, as illustrated in the corpus findings, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan
nicely encapsulates how these two factors were portrayed by the Trump
administration as the main two sources of threat to the security of the Arab regimes. It
says: “the State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions
and Iran’s malign activities, however, posed an existential threat to many of the
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region’s states”. It also stresses that “Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to
assist across a wide range of economic challenges as well as counter the threats of
Iran”. In a strategic shift from the previous US approaches to both questions, the
Trump administration engineered a GCC-Israeli security alignment that would help
the US rely more on regional allies in confronting regional threats as it recalibrates its
involvement in the Middle East.
5.4.2 Implications of Trump-era policies on the geopolitical landscape
By demonizing Iran, through the confrontational “Maximum Pressure”
campaign, and bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel, through a topdown approach, the Trump administration triggered a transformation in the
geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. In what follows I enlist the different aspects
of the possible security alignment between the Arab regimes and Israel. I also discuss
how tensions in the Persian Gulf may heighten as the Arab-Israeli security alignment
materializes.
5.4.2.1 Prospects of an Arab-Israeli security alignment
Throughout its tenure, the Trump administration worked towards pushing the
GCC regimes to align with Israel to face the region’s most pressing issues. It rallied
the GCC rulers to form a security alignment with Israel that collectively confronts the
Iranian threat to their regimes. Of particular importance was how President Trump, in
his first trip abroad to the Middle East, signaled that the US will not fight its allies’
enemies on their behalf. President Trump noted: “But the nations of the Middle East
cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for them. The nations of the
Middle East will have to decide what kind of future they want for themselves, for
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their countries, and for their children”. Added to that, President Trump expressed his
intention and did indeed scale back US presence in the Middle East by bringing back
home US troops from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This implied that the US allies
needed to rethink their traditional reliance on the US for security and stability in the
region in the long run. Wechsler (2019) remarks that such declarations did nothing but
push the Middle Eastern regimes to seek a new security architecture that fills the void
caused by the US retrenchment.
Alternatively, the Trump administration, in a visionary and strategic departure
from the past administrations’ approaches, spurred a geopolitical transformation in the
Middle East. It bridged the gap between the Arab regimes and Israel by portraying
Israel as a potential partner and demonizing Iran and its allied groups as the common
threat to the region. As Arab regimes continue to jump on the train of normalization,
new security Arab-Israeli alignments are bound to emerge and take shape, so strategic
to balance against Iran and its proxies in the future. My findings illustrated that the
normalization of relations between the Arab regimes and Israel will not likely stop at
the transactional and business level, it will cultivate strategic multi-dimensional
cooperation, most notably at the security level, so beneficial for both parties in the
long term. In this respect, in an interview with the Associated Press, Anwar Gargash,
former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs urged the Israelis to think strategically
about the normalization of relations between Israel and UAE. He said:
The only thing I want to say is the more strategic the Israelis look at these
relationships, the more doors will open to them...If they look at it very
`transactionally’, I think that it is not going to send a very good omen for
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normalizing relations with many of the Arab countries. (as cited by Lederer,
2020, para. 3)
A few days after normalizing ties, according to the official Emirati News
Agency (WAM), Mossad director Yossi Cohen visited UAE to discuss “cooperation
in the fields of security” (para. 2) with the UAE’s national security adviser Sheikh
Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Al Jazeera, 2020). The fact that Cohen was the first
Israeli official to pay a visit to UAE, in addition to the security talks, echoes the
importance and significance of security cooperation between the two states. In light of
the security cooperation underscored in the Abraham Accords, it comes as no surprise
that UAE and Bahrain, and perhaps later the rest of the GCC states, agreed to open
their ports, airspace, and territories to Israel. While this may take several forms,
increased security cooperation signals an alignment between the Arab regimes and
Israel. I adopt the term alignment, rather than alliance, because the former is less
formal than the latter. Drawing on Snyder’s (1991) work in “Alliances, Balance, and
Stability”, Ryan (2009) explains that alliances are formal and mutual “promises”
between states in the field of security and defense such as NATO and the Warsaw
Pact noting that beyond the Western world, such alliances hardly succeeded.
Accordingly, Ryan defines alignment as “an informal relationship between two or
more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that may
include, but is not restricted to, security affairs” (p. 5). In what follows, I discuss how
different forms of security arrangements come into play to undergird the Arab-Israel
security alignment triggered by the strategic shift of the Trump-era foreign policies.
First, regarding the Israeli presence on the GCC soils, Azodi (2020) suggests
that the GCC states may invite Israel to establish a military presence on the southern
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shores of Iran. Similarly, Jadeh Iran (2020), an online website focusing on Iranian
affairs, published an Iranian report alerting the Iranian government to the secret aims
of the UAE-Israel peace agreement which were “clear in the geopolitical sense” (para.
2). These “undeclared aims” could “lead to the establishment of Israeli military and
security bases facing Iran” (para. 1), thus moving Israel closer to the Iranian territories
(as cited by The New Arab Staff, 2020b).
Second, concerning the security of the waterways, Israel may increase its
cooperation with the GCC states to better protect their border and maritime activities.
More protection would be provided for navigation freedom as GCC-Israeli
cooperation would better control maritime shipping routes, thus thwarting the
influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) on those areas. In
this regard, Dazi-Héni (2020) confirms that “The Abraham Accords undoubtedly
mark a new departure in the region’s geopolitics” since it “allow[s] Israel
unprecedented access to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf” (p. 6).
Third, as far as cooperation in the airspace is concerned, it is likely that Israel
will use the airspace of the GCC states to strike Iran in case of a serious clash. Totten
(2016) recalls how Saudi Arabia sided with Israel, albeit implicitly, against Hezbollah
in the 2006 war. Thus, he expects it, in a scenario of a military confrontation with
Iran, to allow the Israeli air force to use its air space to attack Iran’s nuclear sites
following an ancient Arab proverb: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” (p. 31).
Saudi Arabia already allowed Israel to use its airspace for commercial flights to UAE
following the establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and UAE as lauded by
Jared Kushner.
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Fourth, in light of the importance of the security cooperation in the Abraham
Accords, conducting joint military drills would certainly be among the potential areas
to test military cooperation between the Arab states and Israel. Bowman and Nagel
(2020) suggest that Israel could join the formidable yearly Iron Union military
exercise between the US and UAE and described it as a "promising opportunity"
(para. 10) in the field of military cooperation. Further, the decision of the US
Department of Defense to move Israel into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
will also pave the way for more military exercises between the Arab states and Israel.
Fifth, it is thanks to the Abraham Accords that investing in mutual defense
looks closer and more feasible than ever between the Gulf states and Israel. Knights
(2020) highlights how the Abraham Accords started to materialize in the military
collaboration between the signatory parties. He points out the signals conveyed by
Moshe Patel, head of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, on December 15, 2020,
who expressed Israel’s interest in collaborating with UAE and Bahrain to further
develop the missile defense sector that Israel and the US already work on. Knights
notes that accelerating cooperation in the defense field will help curtail “Iran’s fastdeveloping missile, rocket, and drone forces” (p. 1). In this respect, Knights
recommends that this collaboration “be expanded to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other
states” which will facilitate the formation of “stronger regional coalitions” whose
objective is to ensure the “defensive containment of Iran, as opposed to costly and
destructive debacles like the Yemen war” (p. 1). He stresses that the US, Israel, and
the Arab allies should double their efforts to address “the urgent need for greater
defense capabilities” (p. 1), much needed to fill the gap in the defense systems of
these states. Regarding the US, he observes that the US defense system came under
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enormous pressure from the rocket attacks fired last December 2020 into the
American Embassy in Baghdad and warns that “If larger rocket salvoes are launched
in the future, such defenses would be quickly overwhelmed” (p. 2). With regard to
Israel, Iran-backed Hezbollah possesses “120,000-150,000 unguided and precision
rockets”, coupled with Iran’s capabilities to launch “missiles and drone attacks” from
its territories, Syria, and Iraq, all constitute a challenge to the Israeli defense system.
The same applies to the UAE which was and still is a potential target of the Houthis
(p. 2). Besides, Iran has invariably asserted that UAE would be a legitimate target of
its wide range of weapons. Similarly, Knights recalls how Saudi Arabia suffered from
the constant Houthi attacks, but also assaults from the Iranian and Iraqi territories, on
its capital, southern towns, and vital economic facilities, most dangerous of which
was the Abqaiq attacks in 2019 which paralyzed oil production for a couple of weeks.
Knights recommends that defense systems be less expensive and more
efficacious by mobilizing the necessary resources and capabilities that the US allies
enjoy. He maintains that Israel has considerable hands-on experience in developing
and operating missile defense systems such as the Iron Dome system used to defend
its territories. Regarding the Gulf states, Knights views that they “are well-positioned
to surveil launch areas in Iran and Yemen that Israel cannot easily monitor” (p. 3). In
a nutshell, one can notice that investment in the defense systems looks appealing for
all parties and represents a win-win opportunity to better protect their states from the
threats emanating from Iran and its proxies in the region.
Sixth, it goes without saying that the Abraham Accords will open the doors for
Israel to collect extensive information on Iranian activities, especially in the Persian
Gulf. This, in turn, will enhance the exchange of intelligence between not only the
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UAE and Bahrain, and Israel, but also the remaining GCC states. Rabi and Mueller
(2017) argue that, for instance, intelligence between Saudi Arabia and Israel
intensified in the last decades. In their words: “the invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise
to unprecedented levels of tacit security and intelligence cooperation between Israel
and Saudi Arabia” (p. 576). In the same vein, the online Iranian newspaper Jadeh Iran
(2020) states that the establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and UAE puts
the national security of Iran in jeopardy as the majority of Iran’s ports, oil facilities,
and nuclear sites are located in the Gulf coast. The report claims that, given the
geographic proximity of the UAE, the peace agreement would provide Israel with an
“eye, and perhaps even a hand as well, a few kilometers away from strategic Iranian
installations” (as cited by The New Arab Staff, 2020, para. 7).
Seventh, cooperation in the security field with the new anti-Iran coalition
could help the US further share the security burden with its allies and partners
consistent with its retrenchment strategy in the region. Knights (2020) remarks that
“Despite their recent economic challenges, these [Gulf] states are still quite wealthy
and could offset some of the $3-4 billion in missile defense research and development
costs that the United States undertakes each year” (p. 3).
Eight, technology is just another field in which the Arab states could benefit
enormously from Israel to maximize the security of their regimes. There is no doubt
that Israel enjoys unparalleled technological progress in the Middle East. Given that it
is the leading power in technological innovation, as underscored by Ferziger and
Bahgat (2020), the Gulf states do not wish to miss the opportunity to strike a
partnership with Israel to enhance their security apparatus, particularly in the cyber
field. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018) unravels the concerns and
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vulnerabilities of the GCC states in protecting themselves against the mounting
malicious cyber activities that target both their public and private sectors. It maintains
that the magnitude of cyber attacks on the GCC states reflects the daunting
cybersecurity challenges and the need to invest in this field particularly for Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Zilber (2019) affirms that “Over the past decade, growing
military threats from Iran, its proxies, and Sunni jihadist groups like the Islamic State
pushed Israel and the Gulf states into even closer security cooperation” (p. 1-2), most
notably in the cyber security field.
Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ approach seems to be yet again
insightful when it comes to understanding the Arab-Israeli security alignment affected
by the Trump administration. As underscored by Ryan (2009, p. 14), “Alignments are
external solutions to both domestic and regional security problems”. Ryan’s approach
proved it has considerable empirical grounds in my research findings and analysis. It
helps explore how the Trump-era foreign policies triggered a geopolitical
transformation in the Middle East through the alignment of the GCC regimes with
Israel. When these regimes externally align with Israel, this could be beneficial at the
domestic and regional levels. Domestically, they could benefit mostly from the new
economic ties with Israel to better diversify their political economy. In addition to
that, they could benefit from Israel’s technological prowess to surveil and silence
political opposition, so important for the stability of their regimes. Regionally, they
could better confront the external threat of Iran and its allied groups. Thus, it could be
inferred that a ‘regime security’ approach may have shaped the shrewd shift in
Trump-era foreign policies towards the Middle East.
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Whilst Odeh (2020) is right to argue that the transformations the Middle East
is witnessing “was facilitated by the weakening of former giants” (para. 6) such as
Egypt and Iraq, my research findings suggested that the Trump administration
embarked on a strategic shift in the American foreign policy that also led to this
burgeoning security alignment against Iran. This was evidenced; first, in one of the
pillars of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign as it aimed to “revitalize our [the US]
traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian
subversion”. Second, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan aimed at bridging the gap
between the Arab states and Israel by emphasizing that “previously unimaginable
opportunities and alliances are emerging”, so important to confront the threat posed
by Iran.
Equally important, my findings and analysis are consistent with Totten’s
(2016) claim that, to the surprise of so many, the Arab Sunni states are aligning with
Israel to confront Iran. They are also consistent with Azodi’s (2020) argument that
claims that the burgeoning alliance between the Arab states and Israel can potentially
alter the balance of power in the region in favor of the US and its allies. Further,
Odeh’s (2020) view lends support to my analysis of the relevance of Ryan’s regime
security approach. She underscores that UAE is bent on upending the influence
stemming from both the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Iranian regime. To
achieve its aims, UAE rulers opted for alignment with the US and Israel to strengthen
the fortress of their regimes against what they perceive as internal and external
security threats. She writes: “The priorities of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) were
clear: confront Iran and crush the Muslim Brotherhood and do it by allying with the
US and Israel” (para. 12).
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Guzansky and Marshall (2020) confirm that the insecurity of the Gulf regimes
is “a motivating factor” (p. 382) in reaching the Abraham Accords. For them, a
number of reasons pushed these states to reconsider their political and strategic
calculations. First, the Gulf states were concerned that, in case Biden was selected, a
new administration would “implement much stricter policies than the Trump
administration regarding human rights and regional arms transfers”, in addition to the
possibility of taking “a softer approach on Iran” (p. 382). Second, these Gulf states
put “the continuation of America’s commitment to regional security” (p. 382) into
question at a certain point, mainly due to the retrenchment policies of both the Obama
and Trump administrations. Third, the deep division among the Palestinians continues
to reverberate across the Arabian Peninsula in terms of who should be supported,
Gaza under the control of Hamas or the West Bank under the control of the
Palestinian Authority. Fourth, the need to confront the growing Iranian threat
constitutes a common denominator between some of the Arab states and Israel. For
Guzansky and Marshall, “the Accords underscore the lengths to which some Arab
states are willing to go to counter Tehran’s increased regional aggression and
influence” (p. 382).
Allied with Ryan’s framework of ‘regime security’ is the thesis put forward by
Jones and Guzansky (2017) who argue that Israel and Gulf Arab states yearn to jointly
form what they call a “Tacit Security Regime” (TSR) (p. 399), driven mainly by the
desire to curb Iran’s growing threat in the region yet without compromising the
internal political constraints. An openly explicit alignment with Israel might be
domestically costly for certain regimes, thus working behind closed doors would be
more efficient not only to fend off mutual threats to security, emanating from Iran and
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its proxies but also to expand cooperation in different fields. Jones and Guzansky
maintain that Israel and the GCC states face three core challenges: Iran’s growing
destabilizing behavior, which constitutes “The dominant variable that has pushed the
Gulf states and Israel toward a TSR”, radical jihad, and American disengagement
from the region. The construct of the TSR, in the eyes of its theorists, draws on two
underpinning tenets. The first one is that geographical proximity is not deterministic
of the in-depth cooperation between Israel and the GCC states. The second one is that
this TSR is essentially based on a mutual “shared perception of threat” (p. 407), that is
confronting the Iranian menace, and not other inter-state issues. While the “Tacit
Security Regime” appears to materialize thanks to the Abraham Accords and the
UAE-Bahrain-Israel alignment, one observes that the Trump-era normalization of ties
between the Arab states and Israel did not spark domestic opposition as Jones and
Guzansky may have expected. Indeed, Fiore (2020) states that there are “clear signs
of an atmosphere for a warm peace developing: Bahrainis, Emiratis, and Israelis are
excited about their joint peacemaking project” (p. 2), to the contrary of what was
anticipated by Jones and Guzansky in terms of domestic opposition.
For its part, given the burgeoning Arab-Israeli security alignment, Iran is
expected to further strengthen its “Axis of Resistance”, but also to look for other
allies. Here, it may turn for Turkey as a strategic ally. Indeed, Azodi (2020) suggests
that normalization of ties between Israel and UAE may push Iran towards Turkey
which, in its turn, was scathingly critical of the UAE decision. She points out that
Turkey has had strained relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even the US.
Regarding Saudi Arabia, Turkish relations with the kingdom further plummeted with
the Saudi assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. For his part, Saudi Crown
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Prince went as far as to include Turkey in the “contemporary triangle of evil” (para. 7)
along with Iran and its proxies in the region. In relation to Israel, at the time of her
writing, Azodi is right to mention that Turkey does not have an Ambassador in Israel.
Indeed, Turkey’s diplomatic feud with Israel heightened in 2018 following Israel’s
“deadly attacks” on the Gaza Strip. It is worth remembering that Turkish-Israel
diplomatic ties were particularly severed in 2010 following Israel’s attacks on the
Turkish flotilla while on its way with aid to Gaza. Yet more recently, in December
2020, Turkey appointed a new ambassador (Al Jazeera, 2020, para. 2). With regard to
Turkish-US relations, the US vehemently opposed Turkey’s plan to purchase the S400 Russian air defense systems (Azodi, 2020).
In light of this multifaceted security cooperation, some scholars and analysts
expect the Arab-Israeli alignment would result in a more formal formation of an Arab
Sunni-Israeli coalition or alliance as suggested by (Azodi, 2020; Knights, 2020; Odeh,
2020; Totten, 2016). As shown in the corpus results, the Trump administration itself
used the terms “coalition” and “alliance” several times. Yet while this has not
officially seen the light yet, one should note that the past experiences of the Arab
attempts to forge formal alliances or coalitions were not successful, to say the least.
The experience of what Walt describes as an “ill-fated” Baghdad Pact in 1955 attests
to the limits of alliance formation in the Arab world. The alliance consisted of Iraq,
Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Great Britain, and the US and aimed to contain the influence
of the Soviet Union. Yet the pact was faced with sheer resistance from certain Arab
states, especially Egypt (Walt, 1987, p. 58). Under the Trump administration, in April
2019, the US announced the Saudi-led initiative of creating the Middle East Strategic
Alliance (MESA). The latter aimed to build a security alliance between the Gulf
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Cooperation Council, Jordan, and Egypt. While some regarded it as an ‘Arab NATO’,
Mick Mulroy, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East,
commented that MESA is not similar to NATO in that there is no ‘Article 5’ which
states that member states will defend other NATO members if they are attacked. He
explains that MESA will help the US work closely with the GCC +2 on stabilizing the
region (Lopez, 2019). Indeed, MESA could be regarded as a US effort to contain Iran
in the region, although the alliance has not yet been formalized given the past rifts in
the GCC, the boycott of Qatar, and the divergent views of these countries on a litany
of issues in the Middle East. It should be noted both Oman and Qatar are already not
antagonistic to Iran. Equally important, Egypt has already pulled out from the talks
due to the lack of vision of the MESA which raises serious questions about the
prospect of such an alliance (Kalin & Landay, 2019). In a nutshell, Ryan (2009, 2015)
is right to maintain that the Arab system of alliance is quite different from the
Western experience as the empirical reality illustrated with the past experiences. Yet
given the demonization of Iran and the mobilization of US allies against it, the Trump
administration may have strengthened the security alignment between the Arab states
and Israel to unprecedented levels of security cooperation.
5.4.2.2 The Persian Gulf as the geopolitical ring
As a result of the Arab-Israeli security alignment, the geopolitical struggle in
the Persian Gulf will likely mount between the anti-Iran Arab regimes, the US, and
Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and its proxies, on the other. On January 15, 2021,
the Defense Department announced that it will move Israel from the European
Command (EUCOM) to CENTCOM. In clarifying the rationale behind such a
change, the Pentagon declared that the US-brokered Abraham Accords brought about
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“a strategic opportunity…to align key U.S. partners against shared threats in the
Middle East” (as cited by Orion & Montgomery, 2020, para. 1).
In light of the GCC-Israeli security alignment and the recent rearrangement of
CENTCOM, anti-Iran Arab regimes would move closer than ever to Israel. The latter
could kill two birds with one stone. First, it would build stronger relations with the
Arab states that have already normalized ties with them. Second, it could move closer
to the ones that still reject it. That is, it will be a golden opportunity for Israel to
normalize militarily with the rest of the Arab regimes under the umbrella of
CENTCOM. The decision by the Trump administration to move Israel into
CENTCOM was undoubtedly illustrative of the geopolitical changes taking place in
the Middle East. In addition to that, since its national security is now in peril, it is
expected that Iran would take advantage of the Abraham Accords to justify its
activities in the region (Ferziger & Bahgat, 2020; Guzansky & Marshall, 2020).
Indeed, Iran’s concerns will heighten in the face of increased security cooperation
between the new partners in the region.
Azodi (2016) states that the Persian Gulf has historically played a pivotal role
in the national security of Iran. Its strategic importance, in addition to the historical
aspect, emanates from Iran’s costly wars of the past. Iran learned from its mistakes
during its war with Iraq in the 1980s, in that the Arab Sunni states will most likely
side with any Arab adversary facing Iran, “Therefore, Tehran’s security calculations,
controlling the waterway is existential to Iran’s security” (para. 2). Drawing on the
importance of the Persian Gulf, no wonder then that Iran embarked on sweeping
reforms in its naval forces to best deal with any threat to its Persian shores, Azodi
remarks.
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Furthermore, the Persian Gulf is vitally important for the Iranian economy.
Most of Iran’s oil exports pass through the Persian routes in addition to the fact that
some of Iran’s major oil facilities are situated along the Persian shores. Equally
important, the Persian Gulf represents the sole “buffer zone” (para. 3) that shields Iran
from its southern Arab Sunni states with which Iran has been historically at odds.
Moreover, in case of a full-scale war, Iran’s control over the Persian Gulf will give it
greater leverage should a serious confrontation erupt. Iran has frequently threatened to
block the Strait of Hormuz in an attempt to show that it could “shock the international
oil markets by disrupting the shipment of oil from the region” (para. 3). Last but not
least, Azodi stresses that identity politics play a key role in managing the Persian Gulf
for the Iranians. The Persian character is asserted in the management of the waterway.
This area is also protected by and under the control of the IRGCN which is, in its turn,
under the control of hardliners that oppose any form of détente with the US. In this
respect, Vaughan (2016) notes that hazardous incidents between the American forces
and their Iranian counterparts doubled in 2016 (as cited in Azodi, 2016), let alone, one
wonders, with the Israeli access to the area.
Overall, the Arab-Israeli security alignment revolutionizes the geopolitical
setting in the Middle East. It also increases the likelihood of balancing against Iran
and its proxies in the region. Given Iran’s obsession with its hegemonic control of the
Persian Gulf as well as its growing influence in the region, the competing powers in
this body of water, and the broader region, are prone to more tensions,
miscalculations, and accidents, especially if Israel establishes military presence in the
Persian Gulf.
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Yet while Ryan’s regime security appears to be illuminating in developing
insights into how Trump’s legacy affected geopolitical transformation in the Middle
East, laying the ground for a strategic security alignment between the Arab states and
Israel seems also to slightly fall in line with the recommendation of Mearsheimer and
Walt (2016, p. 2) and Walt (2018, p. 14) to go back to a strategy of ‘Offshore
Balancing’ in that the US should “pass the buck” to regional actors to maintain the
balance of power in their region. In the words of Mearsheimer and Walt (2016, p. 2),
“Washington should pass the buck to regional powers, as they have a far greater
interest in preventing any state from dominating them”.
Drawing on the underpinnings of ‘Offshore Balancing’, my research
demonstrated that the Trump administration partially set the stage for the return to this
strategy. In addition to the fact that the administration reduced the number of US
troops in Iraq, Syria as well as Afghanistan, it drew the Arabs states and Israel closer
to each other and encouraged them to cooperate in bilateral and regional security
affairs.
Similarly, the analysis put forward in this thesis research lends support to
Yom’s (2020) argument that the US is undergoing a hegemonic decline in the Middle
East initiated by the Obama administration and sustained by the Trump
administration. He expects that the US will adopt an ‘Offshore Balancing’. Sharing
the burden of checking Iran’s growing influence with US allies will help the US
continue to disengage from the Middle East and focus more on China. In fact, Yom is
right to anticipate that the US will change its strategic posture in the region. The
Trump administration rejected the Bush administration’s ‘Liberal Hegemony’ strategy
in the Middle East and instead set the stage for the resort to ‘Offshore Balancing’ in
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the long term. It is the GCC-Israeli security alignment empowered by the Trump
administration that helped paved the way for a more effective reliance on US allies in
the region in the future. Finally, in line with my findings and discussion, Dazi-Héni
(2020) views the rapprochement between the Gulf states and Israel as conducive to a
“new geopolitical axis of Israel and the Gulf states” (p. 7) which the US hopes to be
effective not only in countering Iran’s influence but also in containing the Chinese
penetration in the region.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
This thesis examines Trump’s legacy in the Middle East. In it, I argue that the
Trump administration embarked on a strategic shift in American foreign policy which
affected the geopolitical dynamics in the region. Firstly, I explore this shift that
characterized the policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I conclude
that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign and the “Peace to Prosperity” plan were both
distinct approaches marked with a heavy dose of unilateralism that defied sometimes
international norms. Secondly, I also explore the implications of such policies on the
geopolitical landscape in the region. I conclude that the strategic shift in Trump-era
foreign policies engineered a potential security alignment between the GCC states
(UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, albeit secretly) and Israel as the US adjusts its
commitment to the region.
My inferences are drawn from my empirical findings and evidence. I
conducted systematic research that analyzed a corpus representative of different
genres of Trump-era foreign policy documents. I used Quirkos, a qualitative content
analysis software, to code and categorize the data. To interpret the results, I applied
Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory on the Trump administration’s approach towards the
Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Drawing on Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theoretical framework, I found that the
Trump administration tapped into the insecurity of the Arab regimes in the Middle
East. It played into the ‘external security’ variable by demonizing Iran and pursuing a
“Maximum Pressure” campaign. It also played into the ‘political economy’ factor by
bridging the gap between the Arab regimes and Israel and encouraging economic
cooperation between the two parties, hence the top-down “outside-in” approach to the
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict embodied in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Consequently,
the Trump administration managed to push for a GCC-Israeli security alignment. This
was implied in the security cooperation promoted in the Abraham Accords as well as
in the actions and declarations of officials. Indeed, this could take the form of
cooperation in the field of intelligence, military training, defense, energy, or still even
the possibility of establishing Israeli military presence in the GCC states, for instance.
Based on this potential multidimensional security cooperation, the Trump
administration’s approach and endeavors to sponsoring such an alignment were
strategically important and in line with the US disengagement from the Middle East.
Differently put, altering the geopolitical landscape may have facilitated the reliance
on US allies to maintain the balance of power against Iran’s growing influence in the
region, and thus the possibility of returning to a strategy of “Offshore Balancing” in
the long run. While the shift in the American foreign policy was a thoughtful
approach crafted by the Trump administration, regional transformation was
envisioned at the expense of Palestinian rights. This shift also provoked acts of “Soft
Balancing” against the US on the world stage.
6.1 Research Limitations
Given the limitations of the Qualitative Content Analysis method, findings and
discussion in this thesis may be prone to unintentional bias. Therefore, I first
endeavored to make this research as systematic as possible by setting well-defined
and clear criteria in the research Methodology. Secondly, I tried to support my
findings with as much evidence as possible from the corpus which ended up
somewhat in a long Results chapter. Thirdly, due to the magnitude of data, random
sampling might have saved plenty of time in the coding of data and would have
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allowed more focus on the analysis and interpretation of data. Fourthly, the
correlation between the Trump-era foreign policies towards Iran and the IsraeliPalestinian conflict may need to be approached quantitatively to prove the correlation
suggested in my interpretation.
6.2 Recommendations
Given that Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory is based on insights into both
international relations and comparative politics, it would be illuminating to study how
the Arab regimes framed the external alignment with Israel to their people and which
Ryan’s variable was used the most by the regime elites. In other words, Ryan’s
framework could be further tested to examine how the Arab regimes approached their
alignment with Israel. Further, in light of the strategic shift argument advanced in this
thesis and given the lack of previous diplomatic experience by President Trump and
scores of his appointees, most notably former Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Jared
Kushner, it would be interesting to know how the “principal-agent problem”
manifested itself and addressed when promoting and executing Trump-era foreign
policies. In other words, researchers could investigate how the foreign policy
establishment dealt with the way the Trump administration was strategizing
concerning the most pressing and complicated issues in the Middle East: Iran’s
growing influence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, since my data
focused exclusively on public documents regarding the Trump-era foreign policies in
the Middle East, researchers may find it interesting to investigate the internal
dynamics of the Trump’s team as far as the internal policy disputes were concerned.
In particular to the Iranian question, it would be illuminating to scrutinize how the
disputes between the dovish and hawkish foreign policy actors played out and how
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they affected the policy shift that marked American foreign policy towards the Iranian
nuclear program. Last but not least, given that the Biden administration expressed its
deep interest and willingness to revitalize the JCPOA, Turkey is developing warmer
relations with Al-Sisi regime, and the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and
Egypt) have already normalized ties with Qatar, it would be interesting to examine
whether the Biden administration deems alignment politics very important in
approaching American foreign policy in the Middle East as was the case for its
predecessor especially with the fluid inter-state relations in the region.
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